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Abstract 
 
The way people naturally talk about groups suggests they can be held morally 
responsible in their own right. People speak of blaming the banks for the global 
financial crisis while praising Oxfam for its charitable endeavours. In spite of this 
there is a clear tendency in contemporary philosophy to limit moral responsibility to 
individuals, thereby denying the existence and relevance of collective moral 
responsibility in general and the moral responsibility of groups like corporations, states 
and international institutions in particular. In this thesis I develop an account of 
responsibility that applies to both collectives and individuals. In particular I focus on 
developing an account of collective responsibility that is non-distributive. My account 
does not deny individual responsibility. Nor does it seek to replace individualistic 
accounts. It is intended to provide and additional layer of moral responsibility. I am 
particularly interested in scenarios where the harms are mediated by social and 
institutional structures leading to structural injustice occurring when organisations, 
institutions or governments discriminate directly or implicitly against certain groups of 
people to limit their rights. This is important because some of the most serious 
contemporary harms result from structural injustice, which is a form of injustice where 
the harms are not traceable to individual wrongdoers. Hence the need for a 
collectivist account of moral responsibility. Exclusively individualistic accounts of 
structural injustice do not fully incorporate the many other responsible collectives like 
states, international institutions and transnational corporations. I also consider the 
distinction between guilt and responsibility. Some theorists have a favourable view of 
guilt as it applies to collectives and/or individuals arguing that it has an instrumental 
value. My account of collective responsibility is sympathetic to this view of guilt but 
only as it applies to individuals. In which case the issue of distribution does not arise 
for guilt. 
 
 
  
	   4 
 
 
Table of Contents 
 
Chapter 1: Introduction        5 
Chapter 2: Structural Injustice as the Subject of Responsibility    10 
Chapter 3: Individual Moral Responsibility      25 
Chapter 4: Attributions of Collective Responsibility     39 
Chapter 5: Collective Guilt and Collective Guilt Feelings    69 
Chapter 6: Collective Moral Responsibility      93 
Chapter 7: Conclusion        112 
Bibliography          116 
 
  
	   5 
Chapter 1 
 
Introduction 
 
 
People naturally speak about the character or personality of groups and take morally 
evaluative positions with regard to them. We speak in ordinary language about 
blaming the banks for the global financial crisis or praising Oxfam for its charitable 
work. We talk about what the teaching profession wants, what the government 
intends, what Baby Boomers value and what the financial markets expect. There is an 
attraction to the idea that groups can be held morally responsible in their own right. 
 
Nonetheless, there is a clear tendency in contemporary philosophy to limit moral 
responsibility to individuals, thus denying the existence and relevance of collective 
moral responsibility in general and the moral responsibility of groups like corporations 
in particular (Velasquez 1983, Wolf 1985). This individualism contrasts with a notion 
of collective moral responsibility that associates causal responsibility and 
blameworthiness or praiseworthiness in groups, locating the source of moral 
responsibility in the collective actions taken by these groups qua groups (Feinberg 
1968, French 1979, Gilbert 2002, List and Pettit 2011).   
 
According to this collectivist way of thinking, we can and should blame or praise 
groups qua groups for their actions when appropriate. Collectivists view groups, as 
distinct from their individual members, as being collectively responsible for their 
actions. Such intuitions are a form of philosophical holism where the characteristics of 
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the group qua group, are distinct from the characteristics of its individual parts and 
the group has relevance in the world. This means the group has the capacity to act 
and the consequences of those actions are widely felt. The holistic1 view rejects the 
idea that we can explain everything about an entity by analysing its component parts. 
The actions of the group are not entirely derivative of or reducible to the individuals 
who comprise it.  
 
Individualists view the collectivist approach to moral responsibility as highly 
contentious, arguing that it violates principles of individual autonomy. They worry 
about the fairness of ascribing collective moral responsibility to individuals who do not 
themselves directly cause harm2 or who do not purposefully bring about harm. They 
are also sceptical about the possibility of both group intentions and genuinely 
collective actions. Individualists interpret talk about the character and moral 
evaluation of groups as nothing more than figures of speech. What we really mean, or 
really ought to mean, is that the individual group members are responsible for their 
actions. Groups arise from a series of agreements between individuals and facts about 
those groups can be reduced to facts about those individuals. According to this view, it 
makes no sense to blame corporations, international financial institutions or states for 
the harm they do and/or cause (or praise them for the beneficial consequences of 
their actions.) Instead we should identify the responsible individuals and if praise or 
blame is justifiable in a particular case this is because some individual deserves it.  
 
This debate about collective moral responsibility is important because groups have the 
capacity to cause significant, widespread and lasting harm. This is an example of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1The terms holism/collectivism and holistic/collectivist are used interchangeably. 
2I use the comparative account’s definition of harm as follows: an event harms someone if and only if they are worse off than they 
would otherwise have been (e.g. Joel Feinberg (1984) Harm to Others: The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press 34). There are competing accounts of harm. I do not consider these further. 
	   7 
structural injustice because the constraints people experience, as individuals or as 
members of groups, result from the actions of many others acting as groups, 
intentionally or otherwise. Examples include the on-going scandal of sexual abuse 
involving the Catholic Church, the role of the banks and other financial institutions in 
causing the global financial crisis in 2008, the Herald of Free Enterprise disaster in 1987 
and the permanent damage done to the environment as a result of the actions of 
transnational corporations. 
 
In this thesis I am particularly interested in scenarios where harms are mediated by 
social and institutional structures leading to structural injustice. I refer to Iris Marion 
Young’s important contribution to the debate about responsibility for justice.3 
Young’s individualistic account excludes many other responsible groups like states, 
international institutions and transnational corporations. While her approach draws 
out some important features of the problem of structural injustice, it obfuscates others.  
 
The production of structural injustices in the absence of clear individual causal 
and/or moral responsibility suggests a role for groups and also, therefore, for 
collective responsibility. Since these important structural harms cannot be made sense 
of in solely individualistic terms I aim to develop an account of non-distributive 
collective moral responsibility. This is the most plausible notion of responsibility that 
deals with moral problems such as the harm caused by complex social interactions 
that cannot be dealt with at an individual level.  
 
The debate between the contrasting approaches to moral responsibility tends to be 
presented as a binary choice between competing standpoints. My approach will be to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3Young, I. M., (2013) Responsibility for Justice Oxford: Oxford University Press 
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treat this as a false dichotomy. In this thesis I aim to develop an account of 
responsibility, which applies to both collectives and individuals. My account is 
intended to provide a layer of moral responsibility in addition to individualistic 
accounts like Young’s. 
 
There is also a debate about how we should think about our responsibility in relation 
to structural injustice, in particular with regard to the distinction between guilt and 
responsibility. Some theorists have a favourable view of guilt as it applies to groups 
and/or individuals arguing that guilt has an instrumental value as a spur to reparative 
action (Kutz 2000, Gilbert 2002, Nussbaum 2013). Others are less sympathetic to the 
idea of collective guilt and/or to the efficacy of ascriptions of guilt tout court (Arendt 
1954/1994, Arendt 1987, Feinberg 1968, Young 2013b). My account of collective 
responsibility accepts that guilt can have an instrumental value though I would like to 
confine guilt to individuals. In which case the issue of distribution does not arise for 
guilt.  
 
I proceed as follows. In Chapter 2 I provide a detailed classification of groups relevant 
to my account. I discuss Young’s account of structural injustice (Young 2013e). I 
explain why her individualistic approach to responsibility for justice does not fully 
address the problem of structural injustice. In Chapter 3 I explain the notion of moral 
responsibility and present some important individualistic accounts (Velasquez 1983, 
Wolf 1985, Wolf 2013, Miller 2010, Miller 2011). I also analyse the individualistic 
approach to complex cases of co-ordinated action. In Chapter 4 I outline Joel 
Feinberg’s canonical taxonomy of attributions of collective moral responsibility 
(Feinberg 1968). I also present the collectivist approach to complex cases of co-
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ordinated action, which can be interpreted as a reply to the individualistic approach. 
In Chapter 5 I evaluate arguments regarding the coherence of collective guilt and 
collective guilt feelings (Gilbert 2002). I then discuss the instrumental value of guilt. I 
develop an account that accepts guilt’s instrumental value but only insofar as it applies 
to individuals. In Chapter 6 I discuss and evaluate Young’s liability and social 
connection models of responsibility with reference to her arguments concerning 
responsibility across borders in cases of global structural injustice (Young 2013d, 
Young 2013f). I explain why these models do not fully address the problems of global 
structural injustice she identifies. I develop an alternative account of responsibility that 
applies to collectives and to individuals. This account will include a notion of non-
distributive responsibility that does the institutional work rectifying structural injustice 
that Young’s account denies. Chapter 7 I conclude that not all responsibility is 
ultimately individual responsibility. I also recommend two connected areas for further 
research.  
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Chapter 2 
 
Structural Injustice as the Subject of Responsibility 
 
 
In this chapter I explain in detail the notion of structural injustice with reference to 
Iris Marion Young’s analysis of structural injustice as the subject of responsibility 
(Young 2013e). In Section 2.1 I explicate Young’s notion of structural injustice. In 
Section 2.2 I explain the classification of groups relevant to my account. In Section 
2.3 I analyse Young’s arguments concerning structure as the subject of responsibility 
introducing her liability and social connection models of responsibility for justice.  
 
 
2.1 What is structural injustice? 
 
Some of the most serious, widespread and lasting harm is caused by structural 
injustice. The harms that result from structural injustices are more than mere bad luck 
or straightforward material disadvantage, though neither are they necessarily caused 
by the actions of particular individuals or policies. Serious harms like domination, 
exploitation and oppression are structural because the constraints individuals 
experience result from the actions of many others acting as groups, intentionally or 
otherwise. Many of the threats people facing structural injustice experience arise from 
impersonal political, economic, social and bureaucratic forces. Young tells the detailed 
story of a lone parent facing the prospect of homelessness due to shortages of 
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affordable housing as one example of structural injustice.4 In Young’s account, 
structural injustice is a specific kind of moral wrong that is distinct from wrongs that 
are traceable to specific individual actions or policies (Young 2013e). She characterises 
structural injustice as follows: 
 
“Structural injustice… exists when social processes put large groups of persons 
under systematic threat of domination or deprivation of the means to develop 
and exercise their capacities at the same time that these processes enable 
others to dominate or to have a wide range of opportunities for developing 
and exercising capacities available to them.”5  
 
The harm caused by structural injustice contrasts with the harm caused by the wrongs 
of individual interaction. In cases of structural injustice an individual experiences 
injustice but no particular individual she encounters does her a specific wrong. The 
individuals she deals with act within the law according to prevailing norms and rules. 
Some laws do contribute to her plight but none can be singled out as the major cause. 
Nor is it the case that her plight is due to sheer bad luck.  
 
Structural harm is the harm that is caused by structural injustice. In cases of structural 
injustice, the harms are mediated by social and institutional structures. Structural 
injustice can also refer to forms of injustice that are expressed in the practice of social 
and political institutions. As well as individuals, groups can also be harmed by 
structural injustice.  Racism is a further example of structural injustice in addition to 
Young’s example of the threat of homelessness: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4Young, I. M., (2013e): 43-44, passim 
5Ibid. 52 
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“The most common mistake people make when talking about racism (white 
supremacy) is to think of it as a problem of personal prejudices and individual 
acts of discrimination. They do not see it is a system, a web of interlocking, 
reinforcing institutions: political, economic, social, cultural, legal, military, 
educational, all our institutions. As a system, racism affects every aspect of life 
in a country.  
 
By not understanding that racism is structural, we guarantee it will continue. 
For example, racist police behaviour is often reduced to “a few bad apples” 
who need to be removed, instead of seeing that it can be found in police 
departments everywhere. It reflects and sustains the existing power relations 
throughout society.”6 
 
Structural injustice occurs when organisations, institutions or governments 
discriminate directly or implicitly against certain groups of people to limit their rights. 
One example of structural injustice that operates in this way is institutional racism 
defined as: 
 
“The collective failure of an organisation to provide an appropriate and 
professional service to people because of their colour, culture, or ethnic origin. 
It can be seen or detected in processes, attitudes and behaviour which amount 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6Elizabeth ‘Bertita’ Martinez What is White Supremacy? Available online at https://collectiveliberation.org/wp-
content/uploads/2013/01/What_Is_White_Supremacy_Martinez.pdf Accessed on 27.05.17 
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to discrimination through unwitting prejudice, ignorance, thoughtlessness and 
racist stereotyping which disadvantage minority ethnic people.”7 
 
Institutional racism can also take the form of racist acts committed by individuals or 
groups governed by norms that support racist thoughts and instigate active racism. 
Individual acts of racism such as a racist speech are more easily identifiable because of 
their overt nature whereas institutional racism is less easy to spot because of its subtle 
nature.  
 
Structural injustice does not result primarily from the choices and actions of those 
individuals or groups who are vulnerable to structural harm. They differ from those 
who are less vulnerable to structural harm because they are differently situated in the 
range of options available to them and in the nature of the constraints they face. The 
issue of social justice that arises from this analysis is whether it is right that anyone 
should be in a position where they are vulnerable to structural harm. Individuals are 
differently vulnerable to structural harm because they act in the context of complex 
social, economic and political processes where there is an asymmetrical distribution of 
power. This means there are different degrees of control over their circumstances and 
varying ranges of options available to them. The sources of the generalised 
circumstance of being vulnerable to a harm or wrong are multiple, large scale and 
relatively long term. Many laws and policies and the actions of thousands of 
individuals acting in line with generally accepted norms and values contribute to 
producing those circumstances.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7The Stephen Lawrence Enquiry (1999), also known as the Macpherson report, available at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/277111/4262.pdf  Accessed on 27/10/16 
Paragraph 6.34. The Macpherson report was published in February 1999 following allegations of racism, incompetence and 
corruption against Metropolitan police officers investigating the murder of Stephen Lawrence. The report delivered a damning 
assessment of the institutional racism within the Metropolitan police and policing generally. 
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Structural injustice is referred to as a process because a notion of social structure 
explains patterns and circumstances that persist through time. As part of this process 
some people do things that are individually wrong, for example they break the law, or 
deceive, or behave in ruthless ways towards others while many others try to be decent 
and law-abiding as they pursue their own interests. The process produces structural 
injustice because in it some people’s options are unfairly constrained while others 
derive significant benefits from the same process that harms others. In which case, 
many judgements of social injustices are caused by structural injustice. Social structure 
refers to the accumulated outcomes of the actions of many individuals pursuing their 
own projects uncoordinated with others. The combination of actions affects the 
conditions of the actions of others often leading to outcomes that are not intended by 
any of the participating agents. I return to the significance of intentions in Section 2.2 
below and in Chapters 5 and 6. 
 
Structure as the subject of justice is concerned with the vulnerabilities to domination 
and deprivation that some people experience due to the social structural processes so 
described. Young draws on the work of John Rawls to argue that there are important 
reasons to distinguish a moral perspective on structural processes from a moral 
perspective on immediate individual interactions (Rawls 1999, Young 2013e). 
According to this account, the basic structure profoundly influences people’s life 
prospects and principles of justice should therefore apply to background conditions 
rather than to individual transactions. We should distinguish moral principles and 
judgements that apply to this basic structure from the moral principles that apply to 
the actions and decisions of individuals or individual organisations. Young argues that 
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there should be a “moral division of labour”8 between principles and judgements that 
focus on general background conditions that provide the framework for the activities 
of individuals and associations and the principles and judgements that evaluate the 
individual activities themselves. If we do not distinguish a level of social structure from 
a level of individual interaction we risk failing to normatively evaluating the aggregate 
consequences of the combined actions of many individuals. 
 
By concentrating too narrowly and exclusively on the actions of culpable individuals 
we miss something important about the serious harms caused by structural factors. 
This does not mean that we should discard all accounts of individual responsibility for 
producing and rectifying harm. Such individualistic accounts are analytically distinct 
from, though reinforced by structural factors that cause the most serious, lasting and 
widespread harms like oppression, exploitation and permanent environmental 
degradation. In summary, there are three conditions that determine whether an 
individual is experiencing harm or disadvantage as a result of structural injustice. The 
harms are:  
 
(i) Due in some way to a feature of her social position or identity,  
(ii) Something which she has unjustifiably suffered, and,  
(iii) Not obviously traceable to the malicious intent and/or actions of 
individual(s).  
 
In this thesis I focus on structure as the subject of responsibility using Young’s account 
of structural injustice and structural harms (Young 2013e).  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8Young, I. M., (2013e): 66 
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2.2 Taxonomy of groups 
 
The term ‘group’ is central to this thesis. A group comprises two or more people. 
Groups can be formal (such as transnational corporations) or informal (a group of 
friends arranging a party). Unstructured groups are informal groups that are 
minimally unified by some property, for example: human individuals who drive cars. 
Hereafter I use the phrase ‘unstructured groups’ whenever I am referring to groups of 
this kind. They are to be distinguished from formal, structured groups like 
transnational corporations, states and international institutions. Hereafter I use the 
terms ‘organisation,’ ‘institution,’ ‘government,’ ‘state’ or ‘corporation’ to refer to 
structured groups. Finally, there are even less structured groups that lack unifying 
properties altogether. I shall call these individuals. I use the generic term ‘group’ when 
discussing issues that pertain to both structured and unstructured groups. The term 
‘collective’ should be taken to mean done by people acting as a group, structured or 
otherwise, rather than ‘all of us’ as individuals unless otherwise stated. 
 
There is an important distinction between structured and unstructured collective 
harms (Kutz 2000). Many of the most serious harms inflicted on society happen as a 
result of the concerted actions of structured groups like governments and 
corporations, for example the Dresden bombers during the Second World War.9 An 
unstructured collective harm, like the pollution caused by motorists, results from a 
confluence of individual behaviour.10 Environmental damages that arise from such 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9Kutz, C., (2000): Chapter 4  
10Ibid. Chapter 6  
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‘tragedy of the commons’ cases result from an aggregate of marginal individual 
contributions. The features of unstructured collective harms are as follows: 
 
a) They are collectively brought about, or could have been collectively 
prevented, yet, 
b) No individual’s causal contribution is either necessary or sufficient for the 
outcome or the prevention thereof, and, 
c) They are not the collectively intended consequence of the participants’ 
deliberations (Kutz 2000). 
 
What these cases have in common is that as with the Dresden bombers, no individual 
polluter’s contribution makes a significant causal difference. Unlike the Dresden 
bombers, individual polluters are not intentional participants in a collective act of 
pollution. In the cases of unstructured collective harm, like the pollution caused by 
motorists, the content of our intentions only overlap whereas in cases of structured 
harms like the raid on Dresden the content of our intentions are the same. As far as 
Kutz is concerned participatory intent is the main reason for finding people 
responsible for a collectively produced outcome.11 
 
Kutz’s use of the terms ‘structured collective harm’ and ‘unstructured collective 
harms’ may be confusing in the context of my discussion of structural injustice. 
Examples of structural injustices in Young’s account are also cases of what Kutz calls 
‘unstructured collective harms.’ For Kutz, these cases are unstructured because they 
are not the result of a single co-odinated project where there is an intention to cause 
harm. Young describes the case of the lone parent vulnerable to homelessness in such 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11Ibid. 188 
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a way that no individual she encounters intends to exploit, dominate or oppress her or 
make her vulnerable in some way (Young 2013e my emphasis). Young does this to 
illustrate a key feature of structural injustice; that seriously harmful outcomes occur 
regardless of the intentions of those involved in the process. It may be the case that all 
involved behave impeccably, yet their actions cause harmful outcomes. 
 
Kutz’s main example of unstructured collective harm is global climate change caused 
by the emission of fossil fuels into the Earth’s atmosphere resulting from the actions of 
an unstructured group. Kutz’s view is that such cases lack a shared intention to cause 
harm, which is why they are unstructured collective harms in his schema. While 
Young agrees there is not a shared intention to cause such harm in ‘tragedy of the 
commons’ cases, she still characterises this as an example of structural injustice.12  In 
this thesis I am concerned with cases of structural injustice as defined and 
characterised by Young. I explicate Young’s conception of structural injustice more 
fully in Section 2.2 below. 
 
My account presumes something about collective agency, specifically that collective 
agency occurs when individuals act together in a minimally coordinated manner to 
produce a particular outcome or achieve a goal. Collective agents may be formally 
structured, or not, and they may supervene on their individual members or they may 
be emergent in some other capacity. There already exists a large body of mainly 
theoretical literature on collective agency.13 Theorists working in this area are 
concerned with identifying the conditions for the existence of collective agents, and 
the extent to which these collective agents might be held legally and morally 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12Young, I. M., (2013f): 102 
13For example, Bratman, M. (1993) & Bratman, M. (2013). See also Miller, S., "Intentions, 
Ends and Joint Action," Philosophical Papers 24 (1995): 51-66 and See Searle, J., (1990) "Collective Intentions and Actions," in 
P. R. Cohen, J. Morgan, M. E. Pollack (eds.), Intentions in Communication (Cambridge: MIT Press, 401-415 
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responsible for their actions. My aim is to bring this theoretical work on collective 
agency to bear on collective moral responsibility for matters of substantive structural 
injustices. My position on collective agency is broadly sympathetic to Margaret 
Gilbert’s account of joint intentions, joint commitments, joint actions and joint beliefs 
outlined in Chapter 5. Unlike Gilbert, it is my view that the collective qua collective 
can be conceptually prior to its individual members. I shall set aside reductive views 
about claims about responsibility derived from reductive claims about agency except 
to say that my argument about collective moral responsibility denies those reductive 
views. I also set aside strong ontological claims about groups as really existing entities 
in the world. I say no more about agency in this thesis. Hereafter, collective agents are 
referred to as collectives or groups according to the schema outlined above. 
 
 
2.3 Structure as the subject of responsibility 
 
Young acknowledges two important objections to the notion of structure as a subject 
of justice that are briefly outlined below. I include this aspect of Young’s analysis 
because her individualistic account of responsibility justice is developed in response to 
these objections.  
 
The first objection by G. A. Cohen raises the concern that the Rawlsian account of 
structure as the subject of justice does not involve individual action and the choices 
individuals make in their everyday life.14 According to this objection, making structure 
the subject of justice suggests that the actions of individuals are irrelevant to the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14G. A. Cohen (2000) “Where the Action Is: On The Side of Distributive Injustice,” in If You’re An Egalitarian How Come You’re So 
Rich? Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press discussed in Young, I. M., (2013e): 64-74 
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pursuit of justice. This is important because how individuals choose to act in relation 
to one another often has profound implications for issues of justice. According to this 
objection, we need a personal ethos of justice that motivates the actions of individuals 
within society in addition to just institutions.  
 
The second objection by Liam Murphy is that when there is social injustice, 
individuals, collectives and institutions are all obliged to use any means available to 
promote justice.15 The primary duty is not to promote just institutions but to promote 
the just outcomes those just institutions are supposedly for. For example, faced with 
global poverty the rich person in the developed world can promote justice most 
effectively by donating money directly to humanitarian aid agencies than if she 
devoted her resources to promoting just international institutions. 
 
In response to these objections, Young acknowledges that individuals do have 
responsibilities in relation to issues of justice. Her central project is to conceptualise 
those individual responsibilities given that many everyday social conventions, practices 
and habits individuals enact and re-enact contribute to producing and reproducing 
social injustice. While there are important reasons to distinguish a structural point of 
view from one that focuses on individual interactions, Young argues for an 
individualistic account of moral responsibility that operates on the structural level and 
the individual level. This means that as individuals we should adopt a dual perspective 
judging our own actions and the actions of others from two points of view: the 
interactional and the institutional. We should judge our own actions as individuals 
and the actions of others as individuals according to how we treat people directly. We 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15Liam Murphy (Autumn 1998) “Institutions and the Demands of Justice,” in Philosophy and Public Affairs 27(4): 253 discussed in 
Young, I. M., (2013e): 64-74 
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should also ask whether and how we as individuals contribute by our actions to 
structural processes that produce vulnerabilities to deprivation and domination for 
those individuals who find themselves in certain positions where they have limited 
positions and less power than others. It may be that some people’s individual actions 
are morally impeccable yet at the same time they contribute much to the production 
and reproduction of structural injustice because of the social position they occupy and 
the actions they take within it. According to Young, they have a responsibility as 
individuals to notice this and to actively dismantle those unjust structures (Young 
2013d, Young 2013e, Young 2013f).  
 
Social structures are revealed in patterns in relations among people and the positions 
they occupy relative to one another. We take a structural point of view when we try to 
see how the actions of masses of people within a large number of institutions converge 
in their effects to produce such patterns and positioning. According to Young, we 
should distinguish normative judgements that refer to structures from normative 
judgements that refer to individual actions. The former takes a macro view on social 
processes considering how the effects of actions within institutions are mediated by the 
actions of other people in other institutions to produce outcomes that are just or 
unjust. The latter considers more immediate issues of how people treat each other in 
more direct ways. Young’s account rejects the view that moral principles apply only to 
individual interactions. She argues that individuals also need a point of view of moral 
judgement on the structure that is independent of the point of view of judgement on 
individual interactions. When it comes to responsibility for justice in Young’s 
individualistic account, it is appropriate to distinguish moral judgements about 
individual interactions from moral judgements about social-structural processes and 
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their effects. Young aims to develop a conception of individual responsibility in 
relation to each.  
 
Young’s individualistic approach is illustrated well in her analysis of responsibility 
across borders and particularly in her analysis of sweatshop labour as a specific 
example of global injustice (Young 2013d). Global structural injustices 
paradigmatically include the conditions produced by increasing wealth inequality, the 
negative effects of climate change on globally vulnerable populations and the current 
refugee crisis. Young develops an individualistic account of the shared forward-
looking responsibility we have as individuals to rectify the serious harm done by such 
global structural injustices. She calls this the social-connection model of 
responsibility.16 According to Young, this is a shared responsibility that we all bear 
personally as individuals in a form that we should not divide and measure.17 This 
means that we should not distinguish degrees and kinds of responsibility in reasoning 
about how to take forward-looking action to discharge this responsibility. This 
contrasts with her liability model of responsibility18, which is backward-looking since it 
is concerned with identifying individuals and groups who are liable for their actions, 
which are causally connected to the harm in question. Young argues that the social 
connection model is better suited to cases of structural injustice where it is not 
necessarily the case that specific individuals or groups cause harm. Young’s view is 
that the practical basis of this responsibility is that we as individuals participate by our 
actions in the operations of institutions that sometimes produce injustice. Young’s 
individualistic conception of moral responsibility is that as individuals we need a point 
of view of moral judgement on the structure that is independent of the point of view of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16Young, I. M. (2013f): 96, 104-113 passim 
17Young, I. M., (2013d): 124 
18Young, I. M., (2013f): 97-104 passim 
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judgement on our individual interactions. I discuss the liability and social connection 
models of justice and Young’s arguments concerning responsibility across borders in 
more detail in Chapter 6.  
 
Theorists make a common mistake by analysing injustice as solely or mainly a 
problem of individual acts of discrimination, exploitation and oppression. They 
sometimes fail to see it also as a result of a system of interlocking, reinforcing political, 
economic, social, cultural and legal institutions. Young’s account recognises the role 
such a system plays in causing injustice, yet her response is individualistic insofar as 
individuals have a responsibility for rectifying structural injustice. Young’s 
individualistic account of responsibility for structural injustice does not fully 
incorporate the many other responsible collectives like states, international institutions 
and transnational corporations. While her account draws out some important features 
of the problem of structural injustice, it obfuscates others.  
 
In Chapter 6 I provide an account of moral responsibility that addresses this problem. 
I aim to demonstrate that in the most important cases of structured collective harms 
like global injustice there is a relationship between structural injustice and collectives 
that results from the structural failings of the collective qua collective. Contra-Young, I 
will argue that structured groups like transnational corporations, states and 
governments play a vital role producing, rectifying and being held to account for 
specific cases of structural injustices that cause serious structured harms like sweatshop 
labour. I aim to develop an account of collective, non-distributive moral responsibility 
that does the institutional work Young denies. This is intended to complement rather 
than replace Young’s individualistic account. 
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In this chapter I explicated the taxonomy of groups I will use in this thesis as well as 
explaining the important distinction between structured and unstructured collective 
harms. I have explained what is meant by structural injustice. I have discussed 
Young’s individualistic conception of responsibility with reference to her analysis of 
global structural injustice. I have explained why this is incomplete and why there is a 
need for an additional collectivist account of moral responsibility. In the following 
chapter I examine in more detail what is meant by individual moral responsibility.  
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Chapter 3 
 
Individual Moral Responsibility 
 
 
In this chapter I discuss individual moral responsibility in order to contextualise I. M. 
Young’s individualistic account of responsibility for justice (Young 2013f). In Section 
3.1 I clarify what is meant by moral responsibility with reference to Susan Wolf and 
T. M. Scanlon’s analyses of this concept (Wolf 1985, Wolf 2013, Scanlon 1999). In 
Section 3.2 I apply the canonical individualistic approach to complex cases of co-
ordinated action (Wolf 1985, Velasquez 1983). I start with Susan Wolf and Manuel G. 
Velasquez’s accounts because they are the least sympathetic to a collectivist account. 
In Section 3.3 I outline the individualistic approaches to collective moral responsibility 
provided by Seumas Miller (Miller 2010, Miller 2011). Although I disagree with 
exclusively individualistic approaches to collective moral responsibility, I use aspects of 
these explanations of moral responsibility per se in my account. 
 
 
3.1 What is moral responsibility? 
 
Susan Wolf argues that there is something specific to moral responsibility that resists a 
collectivist interpretation (Wolf 1985, Wolf 2013). Her approach is typically 
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individualistic, arguing that if blame or praise is justifiable in some case it is because 
some individual deserves it (Velasquez 1983, Wolf 1985, Wolf 2013).  
 
Wolf identifies three types of responsibility: causal responsibility, practical 
responsibility and moral responsibility (Wolf 1985). Causal responsibility applies to 
those cases where we are only concerned with a primary cause of a state of affairs like 
the harm done by earthquakes and viruses and when cat knocks over a glass of milk, 
for example. In such cases it is unintelligible to attribute moral responsibility to the 
prime cause. To be practically responsible, which presupposes causal responsibility, an 
individual must be able to foresee the consequences of an action and incorporate such 
expectations into her deliberations about whether to proceed. The individual assumes 
the risks associated with the action she performs, either bearing the damages or 
reaping the rewards that follow. Wolf gives the example of being practically 
responsible for hitting a ball through a window she was playing near because she 
should have foreseen the likely consequences of her actions.19  
 
Moral responsibility goes beyond causal and practical responsibility. Questions about 
moral responsibility are often questions about whether some action can be attributed 
to an individual such that it can be a basis for moral appraisal, which T. M. Scanlon 
calls “responsibility as attributability.”20 Judgements of “substantive responsibility”21 
express substantive claims about what people are (or are not) required to do for each 
other. Responsibility in this sense is concerned with what we owe to ourselves and to 
each other and what others owe to us. To be morally responsible is to be blameworthy 
(if the action is bad) and praiseworthy (if the action is good). We do not only think 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19Wolf, S., (1985): 276 
20Scanlon, T.M., (1999): 248 
21Ibid.  
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someone is responsible; we actually blame or praise them leading in some cases to 
punishment or reward. When we charge individuals or groups with moral 
responsibility we mean something more than merely causal or practical responsibility. 
The adult who purposely knocks over the glass of milk out of a spiteful desire to ruin 
breakfast exemplifies a different kind of responsibility because it reflects more deeply 
on her. She is expressing an attitude that makes it appropriate to hold her morally to 
account. She has fallen short of the standards we impose on each other out of mutual 
respect and concern. This is why we would blame her for her expression of ill will to 
others. People who bear moral responsibility for an action possess the intellectual and 
cognitive capacity for deliberation, the forming of intentions and acting upon complex 
reasons. Such capacity is a necessary condition of being morally responsible.22  
 
These different forms of responsibility are not necessarily incompatible. People can be 
only causally responsible, only practically responsible, they can be causally and 
practically responsible or they can be causally, practically and morally responsible. In 
this thesis I am most concerned with attributions of moral responsibility.  
 
Wolf argues that an individual is only responsible in a moral sense when their actions 
express or reflects what she calls their “soul”23 or “inner self.”24 It is only appropriate 
to have reactive attitudes to individual human adults who are “one of us.”25 This 
means that we should only attribute moral responsibility to adults who are 
psychologically like us (possessing “normal”26 mental health and first-class intelligence) 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22The notion of free will also plays an important role in the debate about moral responsibility. In this thesis I make the 
background assumption that individuals and collectives could have done otherwise. 
23Wolf, S., (1985): 279, passim and Wolf, S., (2013): 5, passim I make no metaphysical or spiritual commitments to the existence of 
souls in this thesis. 
24Wolf, S., (2013): 5 
25Ibid. 10 
26Ibid. 8 
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and express the same sort of soul or inner self.27 Rational and intelligent individuals 
who can communicate with each other in moral terms and make judgements about 
reasons for acting can be regarded as responsible in the sense required for moral 
praise or blame. Another way of expressing this is to say that individuals or groups of 
individuals must have the right kind of inside in order to bear moral responsibility.  
 
An individual cannot be morally responsible for an action if she cannot recognise 
what is right or wrong about it. Wolf introduces the example of sociopaths defined by 
her as people who “… lack a sense of inner disapproval that echoes the social 
disapproval of moral wrongs.”28 They can identify the social disapproval that follows 
from certain actions though they are unable to feel empathy or sympathy for that 
disapproval. Thus they lack the motivation those who are not sociopaths have to keep 
their behaviour within moral boundaries. In which case, according to Wolf, 
sociopaths are not morally responsible for their actions and we should not hold 
reactive attitudes towards them (Wolf 1985, Wolf 2013). In Chapter 5 I argue that the 
core normative category of moral responsibility does not depend on the shape of the 
‘inside’ as characterised by Wolf. My account is concerned with attributions of moral 
responsibility that flow from doing and/or causing harm. In my account, collectives 
qua collectives can be held collectively responsible for the harm they do and/or cause 
regardless of the type of inside they do or do not have. 
 
 
 
3.2 The individualistic approach to complex cases of co-ordinated action 
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Susan Wolf identifies two approaches to organisational responsibility (Wolf 1985). The 
first is what she calls the Atomic View of Organisational Responsibility.29 According 
to this view, the actions and responsibilities of an organisation are functions of the 
actions and responsibilities of the individual members of that organisation. If an 
organisation has done something that is blameworthy this means that individuals 
within that organisation are morally responsible. The organisation may be morally 
responsible for its actions, but this responsibility is entirely derivative. Organisations 
are composed of individuals and organisational acts are the actions of individuals. 
When an organisation is responsible for an action this responsibility should always be 
traced back to certain individual(s) or groups of individuals in that organisation. 
 
Alternatively there is the Organic View of Organisational Responsibility.30 According 
to this view, the moral responsibility of an organisation is irreducible. The argument 
goes as follows. An organisation is something more than its individual members who 
come and go while the organisation persists. The actions of the organisation are not 
the same as the actions of the individual members of the organisation. So, when an 
organisation is responsible for an action this responsibility cannot always be traced 
back to certain individual(s) in that organisation. 
 
What is at stake here is how to attribute responsibility for the harm done by groups. If 
the Atomic View is correct then individual members are morally responsible. If the 
Organic View is correct the organisation and its individual members can be held 
morally responsible. In which case corporations can be held morally responsible for 
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their actions. If the Atomic View is correct then corporations are exempt from moral 
responsibility though they may still be causally and/or practically responsible for some 
of their actions and subject to legal action under some aspects of civil and/or criminal 
law. 
 
According to Wolf, there are two individually necessary conditions for moral 
responsibility. The first is the cognitive capacity to be sensitive and responsive to 
complex reasons for and against certain actions. This is also a necessary condition of 
practical responsibility. The second is the emotional capacity to feel sympathy and 
respect for those reasons, which Wolf calls the right kind of inside (Wolf 1985, Wolf 
2013). Wolf argues that corporations are practically responsible for their actions 
because they satisfy only the first of these necessary conditions. Moral responsibility 
cannot be attributed to corporations qua corporations, though they may be legally 
culpable for their actions in some cases. This culpability is derived from their practical 
responsibility. In Wolf’s account, to be morally responsible is to have certain 
intellectual and moral capacities. Wolf acknowledges that people speak of 
corporations as if they have personalities and character and as if they express values 
and goals, but argues that this is analogous to an inkblot being said to represent a 
human face.31 Corporate values and goals do not result from the conscious thought, 
reflection, deliberation and intention of the organisation. It is the individuals in the 
organisation who reflect, deliberate and form intentions. According to Wolf, 
organisational objectives and procedures can be re-examined, rejected, revised or 
retained by individuals in the corporation at any time. A corporation’s goals, policies, 
structures and actions do not express the felt concerns of the organisation since a 
corporation does not have felt concerns, motives or desires. The corporate goals, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31Ibid. 280 
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policies, structures and actions reflect the motives and concerns of the individuals who 
write them and act on them. In this account the organisation is nothing more than the 
aggregation of the individuals who comprise it.  
 
Wolf argues that an organisation can be practically responsible for their actions, and 
therefore liable for costs and damages, but not morally responsible. Organisations do 
not possess a unified consciousness and cannot think. They are like sociopaths, 
according to Wolf.32 Organisations have the cognitive capacity to recognise the 
features of unwonted behaviour in virtue of the thoughts and deliberations of their 
members. The organisation lacks the emotional capability to sympathise with these 
features. Wolf thinks this is why it is important to hold corporations practically 
responsible for their actions since the resulting legal penalties incentivise them to act 
in accordance with societal expectations. Individuals can think so the organisation can 
reflect and deliberate by way of the reflection and deliberation of its constituent 
members. Corporations can be moved to act within moral goals by holding them 
practically responsible for their actions. A corporation that pollutes a river can be 
made to pay for the river to be cleaned since it is practically responsible for its actions. 
In Wolf’s account the corporation qua corporation cannot be blamed for the harm it 
does though it may be practically responsible if it can be shown that this harm was the 
result of some negligence on the part of the organisation. 
 
This argument for practical responsibility and against moral responsibility in the case 
of organisations rests on the collective’s lack of emotions. Wolf characterises 
organisations as having cognitive capacities to recognise reasons for constraining their 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32See The Corporation: The Pathological Pursuit of Profit and Power by Joel Bakan (Free Press 2003) for an argument that since under US 
constitutional law corporations are treated as individuals it is reasonable to ask what kind of individuals they are. The author’s 
conclusion is that they resemble sociopaths. 
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behaviour. This is why they can be held practically responsible for their actions. 
Crucially for Wolf they lack the kind of inside that makes them able to be moved to 
respond to those reasons. If criminal law expresses a moral judgement then it should 
not be applied to organisations in Wolf’s account. It can be applied to the individuals 
within the organisation because they have the right kind of inside. They can reason 
and deliberate insofar as the individuals that comprise the organisation can reason 
and deliberate. They can respond to external sanctions, for example by deciding not 
to perform an action that will pollute a river because if they do they are likely to be 
fined. What they lack is the capacity to feel sympathy for the reasons why this would 
be a wrongful act. So, if the corporation proceeds with the action and pollutes the 
river it is practically responsible but not morally responsible for its actions.  
 
A further reason why corporations are not morally responsible is to do with individual 
autonomy (Velasquez 1983). According to this view, groups are nothing more than 
collections of individuals each of whom is morally responsible for what they do. The 
individual intentionally performs, or helps to perform an act, and is liable for blame 
(or praise) and possibly punishment (or reward.) This rules out the defence that 
individuals are ‘following orders’ by implementing corporate policies. The buck stops 
at each individual’s desk. Each individual forms a plan of action and acts it out. The 
plans (intentions) and actions are not the corporation’s plans (policies as intentions) or 
actions. The individual in a group setting is always free to think and act otherwise. 
They can disagree with corporate policies and refuse to carry them out. They can try 
to change corporate policies. For this reason, moral responsibility cannot be 
transferred to a third party; it always tracks back to individuals (Velasquez 1983). By 
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default, moral responsibility must be located at the individual level according to this 
individualistic account. 
 
There are two serious problems with Wolf and Velasquez’s individualistic accounts. 
The first and most important of these problems is illustrated by cases like the Herald of 
Free Enterprise disaster in 1987.33 The subsequent inquiry found that there was a 
general air of sloppiness pervading the company but no individual or groups of 
individuals could be held directly responsible for the tragedy.34 This disaster is an 
example of the kind of case where no individual makes a major contribution to the 
harm done yet collectively the individual actions combine with calamitous effects. 
This gap between individual responsibility and collective responsibility is what Susan 
Wolf terms “the leftover blame”35 No individual has made enough of a contribution to 
the disaster to be held responsible for the deaths of the passengers and the crew. The 
collective, in this case the company that owned the Herald of Free Enterprise, cannot be 
blamed because it does not have the attributes required for moral responsibility. In 
cases where we cannot identify responsible individuals, or if they do minimally wrong 
individually but maximally wrong collectively, we must accept that sometimes 
wrongdoing just happens and no one is to blame (Velasquez 1983, Wolf 1985). Wolf 
argues that where criminal and civil law can be applied it should be, though we must 
accept that in cases where in no one person or group of people are responsible for 
wrongdoing, impersonal forces just happen to cause harm.36 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33For a full discussion of this tragedy and its relevance to the moral responsibility of organisations see List, C., & Pettit, P., (2011).  
34Herald of Free Enterprise: Formal Investigation by Mr Justice Sheen Available at 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/54c1704ce5274a15b6000025/FormalInvestigation_HeraldofFreeEnterprise-
MSA1894.pdf Accessed on 31.05.17 
35Wolf, S., (1985): 273 
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This leads to the second problem. It may become much harder to prevent further 
organisational negligence leading to more harm being done. Although legal sanctions 
that follow from causal and practical responsibility, there are some cases like the 
Herald of Free Enterprise disaster where it is not possible to hold individuals or the 
corporation legally or morally responsible for their negligence. The manslaughter trial 
of P&O European Ferries and seven former employees collapsed and no one was ever 
legally held to account for the loss of almost two hundred lives.37 In cases like this 
there is no incentive for organisations or the individuals in them to analyse and reflect 
on their conduct to ensure that little or no harm is done as a result of their actions. 
This could have the perverse effect of incentivising groups who intend causing harm 
to arrange themselves such that each individual does little enough to escape 
responsibility while doing enough as a group for serious harm to be done. For 
example, the criminal actions in News International regarding phone hacking. The 
activities were organised so that knowledge of the tactics used by editors and reporters 
was not widely shared.38 This model could also apply to organised crime syndicates, 
which are not corporations. They organise their activities so that the knowledge of 
their criminal operations are not widely shared, which also protects the most senior 
members of the syndicate from being culpable but where we do have some individual 
culprits. 
 
There are three possible responses to these problems. The first is to bite the bullet and 
accept that there are cases where it is not possible to attribute moral responsibility and 
impersonal forces combine to cause tragic events. The second is to revise corporate 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37“Manslaughter Trial in '87 British Ferry Disaster Collapses” LA Times 19.10.90 Available at http://articles.latimes.com/1990-
10-19/business/fi-2903_1_ferry-disaster Accessed on 11.06.2017 
38Phone hacking trial laid bare the dark arts of unethical journalism” by Karin Wahl Jorgensen The Conversation 25.06.2014 
Available at http://theconversation.com/phone-hacking-trial-laid-bare-the-dark-arts-of-unethical-journalism-27906 Accessed on 
31.05.17 
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law so that in cases like the Herald of Free Enterprise tragedy it is easier to hold the 
company to account for its negligence. It may not be the case that the law can be 
revised such that in all such cases an individual, a group of individuals or the 
corporation itself can be held practically responsible for its actions. This is because 
there is likely to be further cases where it is simply not possible to track individual 
contributions to an event such that any one person or a group of people can be shown 
to be clearly responsible for that event. The first and second responses are not 
incompatible. We may accept that moral responsibility cannot be coherently 
attributed to cases of corporate misconduct while holding them practically responsible 
for their actions. In individualistic accounts it is possible for a company to be found 
legally responsible for their actions without being held morally responsible for the 
same actions (Velasquez 1983, Wolf 1985). The third response is to consider the 
possibility that corporations are morally responsible. This is not incompatible with 
holding the corporation practically responsible for its actions. I present this argument 
in Chapter 4. 
 
 
3.3 Individualistic conceptions of collective moral responsibility 
 
In this section of the chapter I outline an individualistic approach to collective moral 
responsibility provided by Seamus Miller (Miller 2010, Miller 2011). I include this 
account to illustrate the different approaches individualists take to moral 
responsibility. Miller’s account progresses beyond the strictly delineated analysis of 
individual responsibility provided by Wolf and Velasquez insofar as it acknowledges 
the possibility of collective moral responsibility as an aggregated form of individual 
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moral responsibility derived from joint action. This account rejects the central claim 
of collectivist accounts that collective moral responsibility is moral responsibility 
assigned to the collective qua collective. They deny that the collective bears moral 
responsibility for outcomes even when none of the individual members is individually 
morally responsible for those outcomes.  
 
According to Miller, collective moral responsibility is a species of joint responsibility.39 
Each member of the group is individually morally responsible but conditional on 
other members being individually morally responsible. In this way moral 
responsibility is interdependent. Miller’s is an account of collective moral 
responsibility that arises out of an account of joint actions and runs parallel to 
accounts of individual moral responsibility. Individuals who perform a joint action are 
responsible for that action insofar as they had a reason/reasons to perform that 
action, then formed an intention to perform that action (or not to perform it), and 
finally acted (or did not act) on that intention, and did so on the basis of reason(s). If 
they are collectively responsible for outcomes of the joint action it is because they 
performed the joint action so described. They each had a collective end, each 
intentionally performed their contributory action and each did so because they 
believed the others would perform their contribution thereby realising the collective 
end. If a group of individuals are collectively responsible for the realisation of some 
collective end and if that outcome is morally significant then they are collectively 
morally responsible for that outcome and can reasonably attract praise or lame, 
reward or punishment, for bringing it about.  
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Miller advocates an individualistic account of collective responsibility. On this view of 
collective responsibility as joint responsibility, collective responsibility is ascribed to 
individuals. Each member of the group is individually morally responsible for the 
outcome of the joint action, but each is individually responsible jointly with the others. 
This assumes first, that the individual can be held morally responsible and second, 
they might have a justification or an excuse for performing that action.  
 
In Miller’s individualistic conception of collective moral responsibility social groups 
and organisations have collective moral responsibility only insofar as the individuals 
who constitute such entities have individual moral responsibility, either individually or 
jointly (Miller 2010). This is similar to I. M. Young’s conception of a social connection 
model of responsibility is rooted in a notion of shared responsibility that is distinct 
from a collective responsibility.40 A shared responsibility is distributive while the latter 
is not. There is no need to posit a moral obligation that attaches to a collective as such 
since collectives qua collectives do not have moral responsibility. It is only individuals 
that are morally responsible for institutional moral wrongdoing, either individually or 
jointly. When it comes to global structural injustice, for example, Miller argues that 
the extent and diversity of economic interaction and interdependence between 
citizens of diverse nation-sates is such that there is a collective responsibility to 
establish, redesign or shape global institutions to address the needs of those suffering 
from structural harms.41 This collective responsibility is an aggregation of individual 
responsibility. His account denies that there are irreducible collectives that act and are 
responsibility holders. I further discuss Young’s distinction between a shared 
responsibility and a collective responsibility in Chapter 6. 
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In this chapter I have provided an explanation of the concept of moral responsibility 
and outlined different individualistic conceptions of moral responsibility. One of these 
conceptions takes an exclusively individualistic approach to moral responsibility 
(Velasquez 1983, Wolf 1985, Wolf 2013). The other is an individualistic view of 
collective moral responsibility (Miller 2010, Miller 2011). In spite of their differences, 
what these individualistic accounts of moral responsibility have in common is that 
they reject the notion that the collective qua collective as an independent entity is 
morally responsible for its actions. I also analysed the individualistic approach to 
complex cases of co-ordinated action. Young’s conception of a shared responsibility as 
distinct from a collective responsibility is consistent with Miller’s individualistic 
approach to collective responsibility. What Young also has in common with Miller is 
that her account of responsibility across borders denies that there are irreducible 
collectives that act and are responsibility holders (Miller 2010, Miller 2011, Young 
2013d). In Chapter 6 I explain why this renders Young’s account incomplete.  In the 
following chapter I discuss Joel Feinberg’s canonical taxonomy of attributions of 
collective moral responsibility. This taxonomy includes the conception of non-
distributive collective moral responsibility that is central to my collectivist account. 
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Chapter 4 
 
Attributions of collective responsibility 
 
 
In this chapter I discuss Joel Feinberg’s taxonomy of collective responsibility 
arrangements for addressing the widespread harm and wrongdoing caused by groups 
(Feinberg 1968). This contrasts with the individualistic approaches to moral 
responsibility discussed in the previous chapter. In Section 4.1 I discuss the notion of 
group liability without fault. In Section 4.2 I discuss group liability with non-
contributory fault. In Section 4.3 I discuss collective and distributive contributory 
group-fault. In Section 4.4 I discuss collective but not distributive contributory fault. 
In Section 4.5 I use this non-distributive notion of collective responsibility to reply to 
individualistic arguments regarding complex cases of co-ordinated action presented in 
Chapter 3. 
 
Feinberg uses the phrase “contributory fault”42 to refer to the following three 
preconditions that must be satisfied for an individual to be liable to unfavourable 
responses from others: 
 
i. It must be true that the individual did the harmful thing in question, 
ii. Their causally contributory conduct must have been faulty43 in some way, 
and,  	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iii. If the harm is truly their fault then there must be a direct causal 
connection between the faulty aspect of their conduct and the outcome. 
 
Contributory fault is an important feature of the individualistic approach to moral 
responsibility. It can also be located at the corporate level, which can be explained 
with reference to Feinberg’s taxonomy of collective moral responsibility. This means 
that we can characterise collective moral responsibility in a way that is consistent with 
the kinds of cases that feature in accounts of individual moral responsibility. In which 
case we do not need a sui generis theory to explain collective moral responsibility. 
 
Feinberg presents four distinct arrangements for collective responsibility: 
 
i. Group liability without fault, 
ii. Group liability with non-contributory fault,  
iii. Contributory group-fault: collective and distributive, and,  
iv. Contributory fault: collective but not distributive. 
 
I consider each of these in turn below, paying closest attention to (ii), (iii) and (iv) 
because they have the most to offer by way of an explanation of collective 
responsibility in the cases of structural injustice I am interested in.  
 
 
4.1 Group liability without fault.  
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This is the idea that whole groups can be held liable even though not all of their 
members are at fault. The group qua group is held responsible for the morally faulty 
actions of some of its members. This kind of collective responsibility occurs in groups 
where there is a very high degree of solidarity and it normally reinforces that 
solidarity. Goods and harms are collective and must be shared, for example by the 
punishment of all for the wrongdoing of a few. There is a large “community of 
interest”44 which means the wellbeing of all is necessary for the wellbeing of each 
individual. This is prior to agreements to incur this kind of collective responsibility. In 
such circumstances, Feinberg thinks that collective responsibility can be a good thing 
because it strengthens and expresses those feelings of solidarity. Punishing the whole 
group for the actions of a few is an example of “vicarious liability.”45 This practice 
illustrates why group liability without fault is an anathema to highly individualised 
notions of moral responsibility that value individual responsibility, autonomy and 
fairness. 
 
Feinberg argues that people can experience feelings of vicarious liability. This is a 
special case in which people feel responsible for things they have not done which they 
are liable for. Feinberg has in mind the imaginatively sensitive and highly empathetic 
person who can experience the same feelings as another. Feinberg calls this process 
“sympathetic identification.”46 He thinks that this concept can be used to explain 
strong feelings of group solidarity among black Americans (Feinberg 1968). As far as 
he is concerned, in cases like this the living can sympathetically identify with the dead. 
This is because of the strong feelings of group solidarity engendered by the shared 
experience of different generations of black people in the United States. Feinberg goes 	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45Ibid. 674 
46Ibid. 678 
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on to argue that he is incapable of feeling any kind of sympathetic identification with 
other white people living or dead.47 Feinberg means that contemporary white 
Americans cannot feel vicariously guilty about, ashamed of or responsible for historic 
acts of injustice.  
 
Feinberg is right to argue that he feels no bonds with seventeenth century slave traders 
analogous to the sympathetic identification between many contemporary black 
Americans and captured slaves. It would be abhorrent if anyone did. Furthermore, it 
is an impediment to progress, acting as a substitute for accepting responsibility to 
eradicate contemporary structural injustices like institutional racism. It diminishes the 
spotlight aimed at issues germane to the oppressed, redirecting the focus to a wasteful 
plane of apologetics, ineffective assessment and the needs of the already privileged. A 
discourse about white guilt for historic acts of injustice subverts the kind of 
sympathetic identification required to spur progress that should be focused on the 
experiences and needs of the oppressed, exploited and marginalised. 
 
There are three issues with Feinberg’s account of sympathetic identification. First, if it 
is true that imaginatively sensitive people can vicariously experience the feelings of 
others then this means that vicarious feelings of guilt are possible. Feinberg rules this 
out by arguing that there can be no such thing as vicarious guilt due to the specific 
nature of guilt as something that singles out the individual wrongdoer.48 Feinberg’s 
notion of sympathetic identification opens the door to the possibility that while people 
cannot be guilty of something they have not done they can vicariously feel guilty for 
the wrongdoing of others. Feinberg hedges his bets about this, qualifying his 
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observations about authentically vicarious feelings with the comment, “… if there can 
be such a thing.”49 Second, Feinberg is too quick to suppose that he feels no solidarity 
with “all white men”50 dismissed by him as “a motley group,”51 no more of a 
collective than the entire human race. This is not enough to exculpate responsibility. 
Feinberg is too quick to dismiss that he is part of a group of white people who 
continue to benefit from unjust structures that oppress and marginalise black 
Americans. Racism is ideologically and institutionally perpetuated across generations 
by the kind of sympathetic identification among many white people that Feinberg 
denies. Finally we should ask what is authentic about Feinberg’s notion of 
“authentically vicarious feeling.”52 Hannah Arendt’s view is that the authenticity is 
derived from the recognition that it is others who are suffering (Arendt 1987). The 
point of identifying structural injustice is not to make white people feel better about 
themselves by allowing them to feel guilty but to garner greater sympathetic 
identification with the oppressed thus inspiring change. Authentic vicarious feelings 
recognise that others suffer and are a spur to reparative action. In which case the 
notion of vicarious responsibility is intelligible when referring to individuals who must 
stand to account for what others have done, for example their parents and their 
siblings. The language of responsibility is better suited to this task than the language of 
guilt and liability for reasons I discuss in Chapter 5. 
  
 
4.2 Group liability with contributory and non-contributory fault.  
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This is the idea that a group can be held collectively responsible through the fault of 
each member, contributory or otherwise. Various faults can exist within a group 
without causal linkage to harm, but where the absence of harm is a matter of mere 
good fortune or luck. Feinberg provides the example of people who drive home after a 
party at high speeds. Only one of the drivers injures a pedestrian. We are tempted, 
Feinberg argues, to attribute collective responsibility in this case because all members 
of the group share the same fault, though only one individual’s fault leads to harm. 
This is not because their fault was greater than any other’s, but because of 
“independent fortuities,”53 i.e. it was a matter of luck. 
 
People may be praised for performing a morally significant act, or blamed for failing 
to do so. Typically we may think that our moral assessments should not be affected by 
factors beyond the control of the person or group being assessed. In which case, moral 
responsibility is immune to good or bad luck and this immunity is, for some, what 
gives morality its indispensable quality.  
 
Bernard Williams’ paper about moral luck and Thomas Nagel’s reply challenge the 
canonical Kantian idea that moral responsibility is immune to good or bad luck (Kant 
1785/1991, Williams 1981, Nagel 1979). The interesting problem generated by the 
idea of moral luck is that we normally expect to morally assess someone for those 
actions they control. However, Williams’ important insight further developed by 
Nagel is that in many cases our moral assessments of people are affected by factors 
they have little or no control over (Williams 1981, Nagel 1979).  
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Nagel identifies four ways in which moral assessments are subject to luck: resultant 
luck (luck in how things turn out), circumstantial luck (luck in the circumstances a 
person finds herself in), constitutive luck (luck in who a person is and the kind of traits 
and dispositions she has) and causal luck (luck in how a person is determined by 
antecedent circumstances) (Nagel 1979). I am only concerned with circumstantial 
luck. We would normally expect to praise someone if they responded courageously 
and blame someone for their cowardly response. Nagel considers the behaviour of 
ordinary German citizens living under Nazi rule.54 They could either be praised 
because they opposed the regime or blamed for cooperating with it. This was a moral 
test that many German citizens clearly failed. Although we condemn those Germans 
who supported the Nazis and praise as heroes those who resisted them, their presence 
in Germany and therefore the opportunity to behave well or badly was a result of 
their circumstantial luck to live in Germany at a time that called for a response.55 The 
important general point is that the moral tests we face are determined by factors 
beyond our control. We may praise someone for behaving heroically or not in a 
dangerous situation, but if such a situation never arises they will not have the chance 
to distinguish or disgrace themselves and their moral record will be different.  
 
Circumstantial luck is relevant to cases of structural injustice because the net 
beneficiaries of structural injustice find themselves in a circumstance that calls for a 
response regardless of their personal culpability for that situation. In cases of structural 
injustice, individuals who are net beneficiaries of those structures live alongside others 
who are immiserated by the same structures. The normal on-going structural 
processes of society consistently disadvantage the same groups of people. It is hard to 
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assign individual responsibility because it is not always possible to trace a linear causal 
relationship between those who benefit from the institutional practices and particular 
aspects of the oppression and marginalisation of others. Circumstantial luck is relevant 
here because the net beneficiaries of structural injustice and those who are oppressed 
by the same structures find themselves in a circumstance that calls for a response. 
There is a causal relationship between the benefits that accrue to some and the 
persistent disadvantage experienced by others. They only benefit because others are 
disadvantaged. Even if the net beneficiaries are not personally to blame for the 
situation they and others like them are in, they owe the situation a response.  
 
In the case of circumstantial moral luck, we can point to a significant difference 
between blaming someone for the contingent circumstances they find themselves in, 
for example being a net beneficiary of the rewards of an unjust system which has 
winners and losers and blaming them for the extent to which they are complicit in 
that system, i.e. whether they actively perpetuate that system. Those who are net 
beneficiaries of an unjust system are accountable for this to the extent that at the very 
least they should notice that they are beneficiaries and bear witness to the oppression 
of those who suffer under the same system. Bearing witness is only one example of 
how those beneficiaries can face up to their responsibility to act in these 
circumstances. There are other more demanding responses such as actively working 
to dismantle the system they benefit from while exploiting and oppressing others. 
Those who actively perpetuate the system should be held responsible for their actions. 
This demands a different kind of response such as taking responsibility for ending the 
system that benefits them while exploiting others. This argument is predicated on the 
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view that individuals ought to be attentive to the institutions in their society and take 
notice of the good and the harm that they do.  
 
David Enoch distinguishes between being responsible and taking responsibility (Enoch 
2011, his emphasis). He argues that a person is not responsible for something by virtue 
of their relationship to the person who is morally responsible for that thing.56 We can 
either be responsible for something or we can choose to take responsibility for it. 
Being responsible refers to those actions or intentions where being responsible for 
them is up to us, i.e. we could have done otherwise.57 This means that these actions 
and intentions form part of our core agency and once they have taken place we are 
responsible for them. To this extent, being responsible is concerned with past actions 
and intentions that a person is responsible for. Taking responsibility is different. This 
involves an act of will to take responsibility for a situation where no prior 
responsibility exists. This relates to actions and events that fall outside of our core 
agency but are close enough to us for us to be able to take personal responsibility for 
them. Examples of things we can take responsibility for are the unforeseen 
consequences of our own actions, the actions of our children and the actions of our 
country.  These cases fall within the scope of what Enoch calls “penumbral agency.”58 
We are not responsible for these things but as a result of the normative power of an 
act of will we can choose to take responsibility for them. Certain things fall outside the 
boundary of our penumbral agency. Enoch does not think we can take responsibility 
for the actions of past generations not least because making oneself responsible for an 
event in the past would be an example of backwards causation.59 Enoch argues that 
by making this distinction between being responsible and taking responsibility we can 	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eliminate moral luck from considerations of moral responsibility. According to Enoch, 
we can take responsibility for circumstances which are outside our personal control 
but which fall within our penumbral agency.  
 
We may not be able to alter the facts of the situation to say that we are responsible for 
the unjust actions of past generations as it applies to the notion of being responsible 
for them. An individual cannot intelligibly argue that they are responsible for an event 
in the past insofar as they caused that event (being responsible.) When it comes to 
assessing our moral responsibilities in cases where circumstantial luck applies and the 
facts of those circumstances are rooted in past unjust acts we can develop a model of 
collective responsibility. This is non-liable responsibility (my emphasis) where, following 
Enoch, a group of people can choose to take responsibility for the consequences of 
unjust acts they did not cause. Enoch is explicit in his view that cases where taking 
responsibility is not appropriate include the unjust actions of past generations or distant 
others. This is an example of events that fall beyond the boundary of our penumbral 
agency according to Enoch. Nevertheless the long-term consequences of those past 
unjust actions reverberate in contemporary society. We cannot claim to be responsible 
for historic unjust acts, but actions that reform and dissolve contemporary unjust 
practices are cases where we have a moral duty to take responsibility where no prior 
non-liable responsibility exists.  
 
Enoch’s argument about responsibility and penumbral agency is based on his own 
individualism when it comes to moral responsibility (Enoch 2011). Enoch does not 
believe that merely in virtue of being a member of a collective, or a citizen of a 
country, a person’s moral record is automatically stained when the collective’s or the 
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country’s is.60 Enoch considers the scenario where a person’s country is engaged in 
morally dubious projects. When Enoch says he is an individualist he means that he 
does not think there should be a debit on this individual’s moral account because of 
her country’s actions. Enoch argues that if it is the case that legal and/or moral 
charges are brought against this country, it is not enough for the person to simply say 
that these are not her actions. He thinks that her response should be more 
complicated than this.61 Enoch does not deny that there is such a thing as collective 
responsibility; his concern is that given that the collective is responsible the issue is 
how that collective responsibility is distributed (Enoch 2011).  
 
Given that this responsibility in relation to structural injustices rooted in historic acts 
of injustice falls outside of the domain of penumbral agency we have two choices. 
Either we respect individual autonomy and accept there is no duty to take 
responsibility for the situation or we identify a reason other than penumbral agency to 
explain why we have a duty to respond. It could also be argued that if it is solely down 
to circumstantial moral bad luck that a person finds herself in a situation that calls for 
a response then she is under no obligation to respond at all if the ‘facts’ of the situation 
are beyond her control. A notion of collective moral responsibility that applies to 
individuals and non-distributively to collectives addresses these issues. I return to this 
and the idea of penumbral agency in Chapter 6. 
 
We should be attentive to the distribution of collective moral responsibility for unjust 
practices like institutional racism. For example, poor whites in the United States have 
not accrued as much benefit from racist institutions and practices as the wealthiest 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60Ibid. 4 
61Ibid.  
	   50 
and most powerful white people. In these sorts of cases we can suggest that the 
distribution of collective responsibility is proportional to the liability for the harm 
done or the benefits accrued from unjust practices. For example, those white people 
who benefit the most from their considerable political and socio-economic power 
should take the most responsibility for its consequences embodied in the actions of 
unjust institutions and practices. This responsibility is derived from the observation 
that it is not accidental that some groups are repeatedly oppressed and marginalised 
by certain arrangements while other groups repeatedly benefit from those same 
arrangements.  
 
Attributing responsibility only to those who benefit from structural injustice further 
marginalises the already oppressed and exploited by excluding them from a process 
that aims at their emancipation. Members of the disadvantaged groups must also 
consider their position in relation to unjust structures. There are many possible 
responses ranging from the relatively undemanding such as bearing witness to their 
oppression to highly demanding responses such as organising themselves and actively 
resisting their oppression. Similarly, poor white people do not have their responsibility 
exculpated by their poverty. They too can engage in a range of responses like noticing 
and bearing witness to injustice, speaking out, and actively working to dissolve 
oppressive systems. The distribution of responsibility in cases like these should broadly 
track the distribution of power and advantage but this does not mean that those with 
less power have no role to play.  
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This approach involves some moral risks (Lillehammer 2014a). One is that the moral 
standing of future generations is left hostage to the unethical behavior of others.62 
When dealing with case of intergenerational justice this risk is unavoidable. A second 
risk is that it is the same people who come forward on each occasion to take non-liable 
responsibility for harm done to others. We should ensure that when distributing 
collective responsibility we are attentive to existing power structures. A third risk is 
making morally imposing supererogatory demands on people that undermine their 
individual autonomy.63 Feinberg is correct that the actions of white slave traders in the 
eighteenth century are not his actions. Nor is it entirely unreasonable for a 
contemporary white American to also claim that she is not vicariously responsible for 
those actions since she does not sympathetically identify with the white people who 
enslaved, exploited and oppressed black people. To this extent she is not responsible 
for the past actions of white racists. However, while such a response respects her 
individual autonomy and releases her from supererogatory moral obligations, a more 
nuanced response is called for. To say this is nothing to do with me or not done in my 
name or willfully cultivate ignorance of the harm done to others such that one is never 
called on to make any kind of response is at the very least problematic. Pure 
autonomy is not possible given the unavoidably communal nature of our shared lived 
experience. Being part of a community brings with it the collective responsibility to 
respond as individuals and in groups to situations that cause harm or risk causing 
harm to vulnerable others. I return to the idea of collective responsibility as derived 
from membership of the polis in Chapter 6. If this responsibility is unavoidable, then 
we are obliged to be attentive to how that responsibility is distributed such that it does 
not cause further harm and burden the already weak and powerless. It is morally 
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praiseworthy to take responsibility for the consequences of actions that are not one’s 
own in spite of the moral risks entailed in doing so. We must be attentive to the 
likelihood that it may be the same people who repeatedly come forward to take 
responsibility for structural injustice, while the same people avoid doing so.  
 
 
4.3 Contributory group-fault: collective and distributive  
 
This refers to cases where we attribute collective liability to the whole group based on 
the contributory fault of each member of the group. This connects to individualistic 
accounts of collective responsibility like Seumas Miller’s outlined in Chapter 3. Since 
each individual bears some responsibility for some of the harm done, the responsibility 
is not vicarious. This could include cases where large numbers of people are 
independently at fault without any joint agreement to act or communication between 
them. Feinberg provides the example of a thousand experienced swimmers relaxing 
on a beach as a person in the water calls for help. If none of the swimmers goes to 
their aid then this is an example collective and distributive contributory group fault. 
This is because we would normally expect there to be some duty to attempt rescue. 
Given that any of the swimmers could have rescued the person calling for help we can 
say that the harm only occurred because each individual failed to do so. In this 
example we aggregate the blame that accrues to each individual. This is unsurprising 
since there was no collectivity to begin with.64 So far as we know, the swimmers on the 
beach did not plan their day out as a group intending to relax on the beach and so on. 
They arrived as individuals and responded as such to the situation. Therefore, there is 
only individual responsibility at work in this example. This presupposes the absence of 	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structures and institutions and has an atomistic view of the individuals concerned. In a 
case like this it would be reasonable to question the failures that led to someone 
drowning by a public beach. For example, asking why there were no trained 
lifeguards able to respond and save the drowning swimmer’s life. For this reason I 
consider this a further example of a structural injustice. 
 
This form of collective responsibility can also arise as a result of non-intentional co-
operation causing harm. This could be as a result of “folkways”65 or social mores that 
reflect on every member of the group. Referring to the post-bellum social system in 
the Southern states, Feinberg notes that collective responsibility can be ascribed to the 
white people who participated in the of mistreatment of black people in the form of 
slavery and then segregation once slavery had been abolished.  
 
Feinberg mischaracterises these events as an example of harm that arises from non-
intentional co-operation. Slavery and segregation were part and parcel of the 
systematic and intentional exploitation and oppression of black people in the United 
States. This was not something that just happened to result from the folkways of the 
Southern states. The social mores and the systems of oppression were mutually 
reinforcing. 
 
According to Feinberg, the only white people who may be exempt from this collective 
responsibility are those who were so disgusted by the treatment of black people they 
left the South to avoid participating in the racist institutions and practices. Those 
white people who disapproved of the system but remained and did not openly speak 
out should be held collectively responsible for the oppression and exploitation of black 	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people (Feinberg 1968). He notes that such was the strength of the social mores at 
work in the Southern states that if a white person who could freely leave chose to stay 
then it is not likely that they were genuinely alienated from the systematic racist 
practices taking place.66 According to Feinberg, “the 99%”67 of white people who 
whole-heartedly approved of the racist practices failed a serious moral test and are 
collectively responsible. Of the remaining 1% who may not have approved of the 
egregious treatment of black people, they could either leave the South and/or actively 
campaign against those practices. If they did neither of these things then they too are 
collectively responsible for what happened. It was not enough for contemporary white 
southerners to hate their Southern traditions, despise their neighbours, not think of 
themselves as Southerners, withdraw their co-operation or just leave. They had a duty 
to at the very least speak out and, more likely, to actively resist and oppose the systems 
of slavery and segregation even at the risk of ostracism or worse as a result of their 
actions. There are two reasons why they had a duty to act. The first is that they 
benefitted from the system that brutally oppressed others. The second is their shared 
humanity with those who were enslaved and then segregated on the basis of their 
ethnicity.  
 
 
4.4 Contributory fault: collective but not distributive 
 
This applies to cases where through the collective but non-distributive fault of the 
group itself, it bears liability independently of its members.68 In cases of non-
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distributive collective responsibility the harm is ascribable to the collective whose 
moral responsibility is independent of any fault ascribable to individual members.  
 
Joel Feinberg gives the example of the Jesse James train robbery where a group of 
train passengers fails to resist a robbery when the armed gang enters their carriage.69 
They could have collectively disarmed the thieves so the group qua group could be 
said to be responsible for a serious omission. It would have been heroic if any one 
individual had tried to overpower the gang but in this example the heroic path is 
supererogatory so it would be excessively harsh to fault any one passenger for failing 
to take that path. Not only was it beyond the capacity of any individual to bring about 
the morally desirable outcome, it would be unreasonable to expect any one person to 
do so. This is different from the example of the swimmers on the beach, any one of 
whom could have saved the drowning person. The train robbery is an example of a 
case where we may expect more of a group of people considered together than of its 
individual members. A group can fail to act as we hope it would for a variety of 
reasons, for example there is a fear of repercussions. Feinberg argues that the group 
can be blamed for not producing a hero when one was required due to there being 
something about that group’s way of life that militates against heroism.70 In the case of 
the reckless behaviour of the banks it would have been heroic of an individual had 
been able to intervene as a whistle-blower to put an end to the risky practices that 
made a major contribution to the global financial crisis of 2008.71 With the benefit of 
hindsight we can see that it would have been fairly straightforward to put in place a 
series of organisational practices, including a favourable whistle-blower policy that 
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would have prevented the negligent behaviour that led to the financial crisis. In these 
sorts of cases contributory fault seems to be most appropriately located at the level of 
the collective qua collective. This is in additional individuals being responsible is they 
are liable by their actions which caused the harm. Feinberg thinks that this kind of 
collective responsibility particularly applies to corporate or institutional situations, 
referring to the train robbery example as a model for “… a thousand crises in the 
history of our corporate lives.”72 He refers to situations where an institutional group 
persists through changes in its membership and faultless members must answer for 
harms caused or commitments made by an earlier generation of its members.73 This is 
the notion of collective responsibility, which I develop further in Chapter 6 to address 
problems with I. M. Young’s social connection model of responsibility for justice with 
particular reference to her arguments concerning responsibility across borders (Yong 
2013d). 
 
A potential problem with this approach is that it appears to let individuals off the 
hook. Yet it would also seem unreasonable and disproportionate to place a small 
number of individuals on the hook for, say, the global financial crisis when the 
malpractice was so widespread and deeply embedded within the institutional 
culture.74 Individualists like Wolf and Velasquez will struggle to attribute blame to 
individuals in these organisations not least because many individuals had a minimal 
causal impact in relation to the harmful effect of the aggregation of their individually 
minimal actions. In cases where large organisations cause very serious harm we may 
find that there are significant numbers of people who each individually bear a small 
proportion of responsibility. Chris Chapple calls this “the problem of 	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74See Inside Job (2010) dir. Charles Ferguson Sony Pictures Classics, Representational Pictures and Screen Pass Pictures. 
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proportionality,”75 where individualistic approaches to certain kinds of collective harm 
risk either attributing too much or too little responsibility to individuals. This problem 
can be resolved by attributing non-distributive responsibility the collective qua 
collective. In the following section I discuss the application of this idea to structured 
collective harms with particular reference to corporate cases. 
 
 
4.5 The holistic approach to corporate moral responsibility 
 
The Herald of Free Enterprise disaster in 1987 illustrates why we should reappraise the 
argument against corporate moral responsibility outlined in Chapter 3.76 In cases like 
this enough people acting collectively leads to fatal consequences though no single act 
makes a difference. If we also deny that corporations are morally responsible for what 
they do, we are forced to accept this tragedy as an example of a terrible event no one 
is responsible for. This is unnecessary because we can attribute non-distributive 
collective moral responsibility to collectives qua collectives. This may culminate in an 
apology by them for their harmful actions, which does not necessarily impute any guilt 
or responsibility to the members. 
 
Corporations perform morally significant acts so we rightly relate to them in moral 
terms. This type of collective responsibility is relevant under certain conditions. The 
first is that there must be a distinct property or characteristic of the corporation that 
has the capacity to cause harm, for example the racist attitudes that compromised the 
Metropolitan police’s investigation into the murder of Stephen Lawrence. These 
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76For a full discussion of this tragedy and its relevance to the moral responsibility of organisations see List & Pettit (2011).  
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attitudes were later found to be symptomatic of the institutional racism of the 
Metropolitan police. Second, there must be an appropriate description of the outcome 
for which the corporation is being held responsible in the right way. In the case of the 
Herald of Free Enterprise, a particular individual failed to close the bulkhead door but 
how we describe the situation will affect the way we ascribe responsibility for the 
disaster. Like Feinberg’s own example of the train robbery, it may have been beyond 
any individual to stop the robbery but it was not beyond any individual to take action 
towards stopping it. Similarly, preventing the ferry disaster was beyond any individual 
employee though any one of them could have taken action towards ending the general 
air of sloppiness that pervaded the company.  
 
I will address two mistakes in the argument against corporate moral responsibility. 
The first is to do with Wolf’s analogy with sociopaths. The second is to do with the 
account of individual autonomy within corporate structures.  
 
 
4.5.1 Phenomenology of corporations 
 
This part of the individualist argument boils down to two claims. First, experiential 
features like emotions are necessary for moral responsibility. Second, corporations 
lack these experiential features. Concerning the first claim, experiential features are 
not necessary for moral responsibility. From an ethical perspective we are interested in 
the normative status of individuals and organisations. It does not matter whether 
individuals or groups have the right kind of inside in terms of feelings. We can develop 
a theory of collective responsibility that does not require feelings of any kind. What is 
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crucial for being morally responsible is the capacity for intelligent responsiveness. 
Morality concerns what we owe to each other, sometimes regardless of how we feel 
about this. What matters is that corporations are able to recognise certain obligations. 
They can respond to legal obligations, for example by responding to criminal 
investigations77 and by meeting their contractual obligations. Since companies can be 
guided by such legal considerations we can insist that they are also guided by moral 
considerations. The inner life of a corporation may be less nuanced and rich than the 
inner life of an individual but not so much that it should be excluded from the domain 
of moral responsibility. This is an account of the collective moral responsibility of 
corporations that does not require a supervenient state of emotionality. What is 
crucial for moral responsibility in this account is the capacity for intelligent 
responsiveness.  
 
As for the second claim, it is not clearly the case that corporations do lack the right 
kind of inside required for moral responsibility. Wolf makes the analogy with 
sociopaths to show that corporations have the intellectual capacity to recognise why 
an action is right or wrong while lacking the emotional capacity to feel sympathy or 
respect for these reasons. In Wolf’s account corporations, like sociopaths, are only 
causally and practically responsible for their actions. There are two problems with this 
analogy. The first is to do with Wolf’s argument that corporations have intellectual 
capacities in virtue of the intellectual capacities of their individual members. We 
should grant Wolf this point but then extend it to argue that corporations have 
emotional capacities by virtue of the emotional capacities of their individual members. 
If corporations can be said to think insofar as their members can think, we can say 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
77Rolls Royce apologises in court after settling bribery case The Guardian 16/01/17. Available at 
https://www.theguardian.com/business/2017/jan/17/rolls-royce-apologises-bribery-671m-uk-us-
brazil?CMP=Share_iOSApp_Other Accessed on 16/01/17  
	   60 
they have emotions insofar as their members have emotions. To be morally 
responsible for their actions corporations only need to be composed of people who 
possess the necessary intellectual and emotional states. The second problem is to do 
with the analogy itself. Sociopaths are not made up of sub-parts that have the requisite 
capacities. Most or all of a corporation’s members are not sociopaths. They can 
intellectually and emotionally connect to the reasons why an action is right or wrong. 
If my computer crashes causing me to lose my work it makes no sense for me to blame 
the computer. If my computer has been serviced by a corporation several times and 
each time it has crashes again, it is sensible for me to resent the company that repeats 
this mistake. Like all corporations it comprises individuals we can stand in a moral 
relation to. It is not staffed entirely by sociopaths indifferent to whether their clients’ 
recently serviced computers crash causing them to lose their work. The mental and 
emotional states of a relevant kind are in place vis-à-vis the corporation’s members for 
us to rightly hold it morally responsible for its actions. My on-going travails with my 
computer have something to do with some or all of the corporation’s employees and 
something about the corporation itself, which repeats its mistake regardless of changes 
in personnel.  
 
 
4.5.2 Individual autonomy in a corporate structure 
 
Given what Wolf and Velasquez have to say about individual autonomy the example 
of the company that serviced my computer seems to reinforce their argument about 
individual moral responsibility. What I should be doing is focussing my efforts on 
identifying the individual non-sociopathic technicians who have failed to do their job 
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properly and hold them to account in terms of causal, practical and moral 
responsibility. Yet to only do this would be a mistake. Wolf and Velasquez over-
emphasise the nature and scope of individual autonomy within a corporate structure. 
Christian List and Philip Pettit attribute moral responsibility (and some rights and 
duties) to groups, conceived of as entities that are distinct from and persist through 
changes to their individual members (List and Pettit 2011). They make the strong 
ontological claim that groups are a really existing presence in the world.78 They are 
composites constituted over and above the aggregation the individuals. These groups 
possess, process and act upon beliefs and desires as individuals do. List and Pettit deny 
any metaphysical commitments to “mysterious forces”79 or some substance out there 
in the world. Their really existing presence is derived from consistency and higher-
level regularities derived from the emergence of coordinated psychologically 
intelligible dispositions of the group’s individual members. This coordination is far 
from straightforward insofar as it may be that there are group-level attitudes that a 
majority or all of the individual members reject.80 The attitudes, actions, processes 
and goals of the group supervene on those of the individuals. So, the primary centre of 
responsibility is the group, not the individual (List and Pettit 2011). 
 
There are two non-negotiable features of groups in this account: supervenience and 
rationality. The attitudes and actions of the group supervene on those of the 
individuals. This explains why group level attitudes may diverge from attitudes held 
by individuals. Any actual or possible individual or collective is by and large rational. 
Groups possess and act on shared intentionality. This account allows for a range of 
dispositions on the part of individuals towards the shared intentions. Some may 	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enthusiastically embrace the intentions of the corporation. Others may go along with 
them for want of a better alternative. While others may act to fulfil intentions that 
they do not agree with but acknowledge others share. There is a varied pattern of 
coordination with some playing a large part while others play a much smaller role and 
the ascription of responsibility should mirror this distribution.  
 
Organisations are designed and people in them trained such that decisions are taken 
and acted upon to fulfil the organisation’s goals. This is why moral responsibility 
accrues to corporations as well as to some or all their individual members. The 
structured relationships, processes and goals of a corporation supervene on the 
thoughts, emotions and actions of their members who introject the prevailing culture 
of an organisation. This explains why a dysfunctional corporation endures in spite of 
changes to its individual members.  
 
It is not the case that individual corporate members can simply refuse to carry out the 
organisation’s group-level intentions. The corporation exercises control over the 
individual acting in a way that is intentional and rational through the culture of the 
organisation, its constitution, internal arrangements for the division of roles, lines of 
accountability, job-roles and so on. These are designed to ensure the individual 
members act appropriately. The actions of whistle-blowers demonstrate that 
individuals can resist the culture and practices of an organisation they find 
abhorrent.81 An organisation’s culture and practices, as well as peer pressure, 
groupthink and financial pressures can lead to people doing things they might not 
normally consider acceptable or even agree with. The desires and intentions are there 
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even if individuals disassociate themselves from them. We can view the corporation as 
an entity distinct from its individual members. In which case we can sensibly attribute 
moral responsibility to corporations qua corporations.  
 
To explain the relationship between groups and individual members, Pettit uses an 
analogy with water being brought to the boil in a closed flask that causes the flask to 
break (Pettit 2007). Just as the water temperature controls for the breaking of the flask, 
the corporation exercises control over the individual acting in a way that is intentional 
and rational through the culture of the organisation (analogous to the temperature of 
the water), its constitution, internal arrangements for the division of roles, lines of 
accountability, job-roles and so on. These group-level arrangements ensure the 
individual acts in the appropriate manner. List and Pettit ascribe the groups the status 
of persons, arguing that they are fit to be judged and held responsible for their actions 
and possess rights and duties. Pettit uses the following slogan to explain what this 
means in practice: 
 
“No incorporated agency without incorporated responsibility, and this, even 
when individual responsibility is diminished.”82 
 
The sanctions that flow from this kind of responsibility are the sanctions we normally 
associate with moral responsibility. Given the nature of the collectivist argument, the 
ascription of responsibility goes beyond what Pettit calls “the desk where the buck 
stops.”83 There are three individually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for an 
individual or a group to be held responsible: the individual or group faced a morally 
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significant choice, the individual or group knows what is at stake and they could have 
done otherwise (List and Pettit 2011). This diverges from Wolf’s argument that having 
‘the right kind of inside’ is a necessary condition for moral responsibility (Wolf 1985, 
Wolf 2013). Corporate bodies can be held morally responsible in the same way that 
individuals can be held morally responsible for their actions. This includes mens rea 
where corporations can display a guilty mind in the form of malice with foresight and 
recklessness. For example, Volkswagen intentionally cheated its way through global 
diesel emissions standards and then intentionally misled its potential customers about 
how environmentally friendly its cars are.84 Wolf would argue that organisations do 
not posses a mind; there are only the minds of the individual members. The account 
of organisational responsibility offered by List and Pettit is consistent with Feinberg’s 
notion of group liability with collective non-distributive fault. As in the example of the 
train robbery, when individual responsibility is diminished, collective responsibility 
remains intact. This addresses the problem of leftover blame identified by Wolf and 
Vasquez and can deal with cases like the Herald of Free Enterprise disaster. 
 
Corporations, like bureaucracies, operate on a different time scale from their 
individual members in terms of planning and the scope of their actions. This makes 
them independent of their individual members to a very large extent. The complexity 
of their internal systems and arrangements make their actions and processes unclear 
and impermeable. It is not obviously the case that any individual can have an impact 
on the organisation, nor that the actions of the corporation are the expression of any 
one person’s intentions. Their performance and internal systems and processes are 
amendable to change as a result of reform and modification but this can be very hard 	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to achieve, or achieved very slowly, due to the extent to which the collective is 
independent of its individual members. This is why people who are appointed from 
the outside to radically reform a corporation find it hard if not impossible to 
significantly alter its culture and practices. Corporations and bureaucracies can 
absorb individuals, in spite of their best efforts to the contrary. Even very large 
corporations can do this by co-ordinating, subordinating and synthesising the actions 
and intentions of thousands of its various individual members. The structure of the 
organisation transforms these many and varied individual intentions and actions into 
truly corporate intentions and actions. 
 
There are three reasons to accept the attribution of non-distributive collective moral 
responsibility to corporations: 
 
1. The attribution of non-distributive collective moral responsibility to 
corporations addresses the serious problem of leftover blame, i.e. what is left 
over in terms of allocating responsibility that cannot be covered by the 
ascription of responsibility to individuals. There are occasions where 
individuals are not fully and/or clearly culpable. They may be blamelessly 
ignorant of the harm they have brought about. Individual contribution to 
harm done may be negligible and/or hard to trace. No individual could have 
made a difference were they to have acted otherwise. The organisational harm 
done is maximally wrong yet the harm done by each individual member is 
minimally wrong. There are cases where individuals know the harm that will 
be done by the group and what their individual contribution will be but feel 
pressured to comply. Such shortfalls are distressing to the victims since 
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although the individuals did something harmful collectively there is no 
individual or group that can be held responsible. This is exemplified in the 
Herald of Free Enterprise disaster where relatives of the victims were unable to 
prosecute those responsible for the negligence that led to 193 deaths. Although 
the inquiry into the disaster severely criticised the company operating the 
ferry, neither the company nor its individual employees were found guilty of a 
criminal offence. P&O European Ferries and several of their employees were 
charged with manslaughter, the judge in the subsequent trial ordered the jury 
to acquit the defendants. The relatives of the victims would reasonably expect 
the company and key individuals to be held to account for their negligence. In 
this case, no such accountability was forthcoming. In the accounts given by 
List and Pettit we can hold the group responsible for what it arranges to have 
done, the decisions it licenses and the internal organisation and coordination 
by which it makes possible the harmful action (Pettit 2007, List and Pettit 
2011). 
 
2. The account of groups chimes with our experiences of the psychopathology of 
organisational life such as the enduring ethos of an institution even when there 
is a large turnover of staff and the emergence of groupthink. There is talk of 
the character of an organisation that operates in a deep way and is resistant to 
change and persists through time. The existence of groups that supervene on 
individuals is derived from consistency, higher-level regularities and 
coordinated psychologically intelligible dispositions. This is what gives the 
organisation the intellectual and cognitive capacity for deliberation, the 
capacity to form of intentions and the ability to act upon a range of complex 
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reasons. Such capacity is a necessary condition of being morally and 
practically responsible. It is these higher-level capacities that turn the actions 
of individuals into a different action that is the action of the organisation 
(which is them acting collectively.) 
 
3. There is an instrumental advantage since this account may have a 
developmental impact on organisations that cause harm. If we hold 
corporations responsible for the harm they do we may be able to induce self-
awareness and self-regulation towards better conduct. In cases where there is a 
deficit in individual accountability this account removes perverse incentive on 
the part of individuals where a collection of individuals could combine to cause 
harm and arrange things in such a way that not one of them is held 
responsible for that harm. This account may also create an upward pressure 
from individuals combining to force organisations to modify their behaviour. 
 
In this chapter I have outlined and agreed with two views. The first view I agreed with 
is the view that a group can be more than the aggregation of its individual members. 
The second view I agreed with is the view of collectives as responsibility holders, non-
distributively. In which case it is plausible to argue that collectives like corporations 
are morally responsible for what they do. If we accept this view of collectives as 
morally responsible for their actions we can hold them to account for their actions, 
which is important when we consider the serious harm they cause. We may also be 
able to induce self-awareness and self-regulation towards better conduct. This has 
implications for Young’s individualistic arguments concerning responsibility across 
borders, which explicitly deny a role for collectives like states, international institutions 
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and transnational corporations as responsibility holders non-distributively. In the 
following chapter I examine an aspect of the debate about collective responsibility that 
is concerned with collective guilt and collective guilt feelings. 
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Chapter 5 
 
Collective Guilt and Collective Guilt Feelings 
 
 
In this chapter I examine the topic of collective moral guilt and collective guilt 
feelings. I introduce this subject for three reasons. The first reason is that I aim to 
show that the issue of the distribution of responsibility does not arise for guilt. The 
second reason is that I want to further address Susan Wolf’s argument that we cannot 
attribute moral responsibility to collectives because they lack the right kind of inside 
(Wolf 1985, Wolf 2013). The third reason is that if a collectivist account of joint 
actions and intentions is plausible then this adds weight to the argument that moral 
responsibility can be attributed to collectives qua collectives. I also evaluate the 
arguments regarding the instrumental value of guilt. Unlike I. M. Young I am 
sympathetic to the view that guilt can have an instrumental value but, like Arendt and 
unlike Gilbert, I want to confine guilt to individuals (Young 2013b, Arendt 
1954/1994, Arendt 1987, Gilbert 2002). In Section 5.1 I discuss Margaret Gilbert’s 
arguments concerning collective guilt and collective guilt feelings. In Section 5.2 I 
evaluate Gilbert’s plural subject account. In Section 5.3 I examine the relationship 
between collective responsibility and collective guilt. In this section I also evaluate 
Young’s scepticism regarding the instrumental value of guilt. 
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5.1 Margaret Gilbert’s argument 
 
Margaret Gilbert is concerned with collective moral responsibility expressed in terms 
of collective guilt feelings (Gilbert 2002). In Gilbert’s account the relationship between 
being responsible and being guilty is that the latter is a way of being responsible. We 
can view Gilbert’s approach as a rejoinder to Susan Wolf’s argument that collectives 
qua collectives cannot be morally responsible because they are unable to 
sympathetically identify with the reasons for behaving (or not behaving) in certain 
ways. As Martha Nussbaum acknowledges, there is an instrumental reason for 
attributing the feelings and emotions that go with moral responsibility like shame, 
guilt and regret that is to do with those emotions serving as a spur to action 
(Nussbaum 2013).  
 
Gilbert argues that collectives qua collectives can act, can act freely (insofar as they 
could have done otherwise) and hold beliefs about the rightness or wrongness of their 
actions. Therefore, collectives qua collectives can be morally responsible in the same 
way that individuals can be morally responsible. Crucially, Gilbert provides a model 
for how collectives feel guilt that satisfies conditions for attributions of collective moral 
responsibility. This is important because if Gilbert’s argument about collective 
emotions succeeds then Wolf’s argument is mistaken. If having feelings of guilt is 
necessary for being guilty then contra Wolf, Gilbert shows that some groups, non-
distributively, meet that condition.  
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Gilbert’s account views guilt as curative insofar as it encourages the restoration of 
good relations between the victim and the perpetrator of a wrongful act.85 According 
to Gilbert the victim of a harmful action is more likely to feel well disposed towards 
the individual that caused the harm if the latter feels guilty. Feelings of guilt may 
encourage the wrongdoer to engage in constructive self-examination, change and 
make amends (Gilbert 2002). If collectives experience feelings of guilt then it could be 
of significant practical importance. Guilt can be an important spur to action if those 
who experience guilt feelings experience optimal levels of guilt. A well-developed 
capacity for guilt leads to a morality of reparation and empathetic regard. That guilty 
feelings have value, however, does not prove it is possible for a collective to feel guilt, 
though it does demonstrate that whether such emotions are possible is important. I 
discuss further the instrumental value of guilt in Section 5.3.2 below. 
 
Gilbert’s argument begins with an account of what it is for a collective to intend to do 
something and then act on that intention. According to this account, there is a 
collective that intends to ϕ if and only if its members are jointly committed to intend 
as a collective body to ϕ. Her view is that a genuinely collective intention is something 
more than an overlap of individual intentions.86 While Gilbert accepts that this means 
the collective should be treated as a thing in itself, she stops short of endorsing the 
view that the collective is conceptually prior to its individual members.87 I return to 
this point in Section 5.2 below. 
 
Gilbert develops a related account of collective beliefs and judgements. She then 
argues that a collective as such can feel guilty of performing a wrongful act. Gilbert 	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defines “a feeling of personal guilt”88 as a feeling of guilt over one’s own actions. She 
rejects the view that collective guilt feelings are an aggregate of individual feelings of 
personal guilt. Gilbert argues that it is intelligible for the group’s members to 
experience “membership guilt feelings”89 over what the group has done if they were 
party to the joint commitment that underpins the collective intention and action.  
 
Gilbert’s account of collective guilt feelings is separate from her account of 
membership guilt feelings. She develops a plural subject account of collective guilt 
feelings derived from a ground-level joint commitment by the group’s members to feel 
guilt as a body.90 This means that the collective qua collective feels guilty, not that X 
and Y feel guilty for the collective. Those members of the group who are party to this 
joint commitment may experience ‘pangs’ of guilt associated with personal and 
membership group feelings.91 The pangs of guilt so described by Gilbert may be 
thought of as providing a phenomenology of collective guilt. Feeling-sensations like 
‘pangs’ of guilt or the ‘sting’ of shame are not an essential feature of Gilbert’s account 
of collective responsibility. Gilbert’s view is that in order to feel guilt, an individual 
must have certain thoughts about her situation and be disposed to act in certain ways. 
If she feels guilt over what she has done then she must believe that she has done 
something wrong. For Gilbert, this cognitive state lies at the heart of the emotion 
rather than specific feeling-sensations.92 Gilbert’s account of collective guilty feelings 
does not rest on a commitment to specific or any phenomenological conditions for 
types of emotions. What matters is the individual’s judgement that she was wrong to 
do the thing she feels guilty about. According to Gilbert, while guilty feelings may or 
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may not involve certain types of feeling-sensations they do entail a kind of belief or 
judgement about the action performed.93 Gilbert aims to show that people are right to 
talk holistically about the beliefs, judgements and responsibility of groups. If those 
collectives believe or judge that they have done something right or wrong then it 
makes sense for them to be collectively guilty. In this way, collectives do have the kind 
of inside in terms of cognitive states to do with attitudes (beliefs and intentions) 
required for moral responsibility. In Gilbert’ account collective guilt is a way of being 
collectively responsible. 
 
In Gilbert’s account, the existence of collective responsibility has no implications with 
respect to the personal responsibility of the group's individual members. For Gilbert, a 
collective is a technical term that connotes a stronger version of a group. It refers to a 
population she conceives of as a genuinely collective (original emphasis) subject of 
intention and action if and only if it can be regarded as having an intention of its 
own.94 There is an intention of the population as a whole (original emphasis).95 A 
collective is something more than an overlap or aggregate of the intentions of 
individuals. This allows for the possibility of a radical disjunction between the specific 
intentions of groups and the intentions of its individual members. For Gilbert, a 
genuinely collective action requires a collective goal or intention the collective’s 
members are jointly committed to intend to fulfil. For this reason, a joint commitment 
is not a set of personal commitments; it is a truly joint commitment of two or more 
persons that neither side can rescind unilaterally. Collectives formed in this way are 
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the potential subjects of moral responsibility in Gilbert’s account, which turns on the 
notion of ‘joint commitment.’96  
 
“A population P has a collective intention to do A if and only if the members of 
P are jointly committed to intending as a body to do A.”97  
 
When X and Y make a joint commitment they constitute a plural subject. This can be 
explained by first considering what it means for an individual to make a commitment. 
Suppose that she decides to ϕ. This can be seen as a personal commitment to ϕ failing 
a change of mind. A joint commitment is a truly joint commitment of two or more 
persons rather than a set of personal commitments. The initiators of a joint 
commitment create the whole of it by working with the other parties. A joint 
commitment does not break down into component parts though it does have 
implications for individual members. No individual can unilaterally rescind the 
commitment unless there are special side arrangements. A collective enters into a joint 
commitment in much the same way an individual does through an expression of a 
personal decision that is out in the open for all concerned. Some joint commitments 
are arrived at in an explicit manner while some others are arrived at less explicitly 
over a period of time. According to Gilbert, collective responsibility is intelligible if the 
individual members are party to the joint commitment that lies at the base of the 
relevant collective intention and action. The collective has acted in a blameworthy or 
praiseworthy fashion, so it is collectively responsible for that act.  
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Gilbert further argues that there can be an authority-producing joint commitment 
where the members of a collective are jointly committed to ϕ even if not everyone in 
that collective knows or conceives of the content of that commitment. This is because 
there is a ground-level joint commitment to authorise a body to act on the collective’s 
behalf. In the case of the nation this can be the government, in the case of a battalion 
of soldiers it can be the battalion’s commander and in the case of a gang it can be the 
gang’s leader. In this way a collective qua collective can be jointly committed to ϕ.  
 
When it comes to larger groups such as whole nations, Gilbert thinks that knowledge 
of these commitments can filter through to others in a general sense. This account of 
derived joint commitments allows Gilbert to provide an account of collective moral 
responsibility for actions that are the actions of the collective qua collective if only 
some members of the group act for the group as a representative. This may entail a 
minority of the collective or even just one member of the collective being jointly 
authorised to act on the collective’s behalf. For a group to jointly commit to ϕ they 
constitute themselves as a single body to ϕ. To act on this joint commitment is to act 
collectively. Gilbert’s argument is that a collective constituted in this way is also jointly 
committed to collectively believing something about ϕ (Gilbert 2002). If they 
collectively believe or judge that ϕ is wrongful then it is possible they may be 
collectively responsible for ϕ.  
 
Gilbert’s account of joint commitments and joint actions is holistic because it cannot 
be analysed as an aggregate of individual commitments. The parties to a joint 
commitment form an irreducible plural subject.98 The actions of plural subjects should 
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be understood as actions based on commitments and intentions that are over and 
above the commitments and intentions of individual members of the collective.  
 
“A population P collectively performed action A if and only if the members of P 
were jointly committed to intending as a body to do A, and, acting in the light 
of this joint commitment, relevant members of P acted so as to satisfy this 
intention.”99 
 
Gilbert’s analysis of collective action means that it is intelligible to argue for the 
collective guilt of any member of the collective including individuals who do not 
directly contribute to ϕ. This is because they are linked to ϕ through their 
participation in the foundational joint commitment to ϕ. The joint commitment is 
crucial to Gilbert’s argument because it grounds each member’s ability to justifiably 
say, “We did it.”100 In which case, collective guilt can exist in the absence of the 
personal guilt on the part of individual members. 
 
Gilbert then develops an account of collective belief that runs alongside her account of 
joint commitments so that: 
 
“Members of a population P collectively believe that p if and only if they are jointly 
committed to believe as a body that p.”101 
 
These beliefs include moral beliefs so by Gilbert’s lights it makes sense to say that a 
collective did something it believes to be right or wrong. Such collective beliefs are 	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independent of the beliefs of the individual members of the collective. The members 
of the collective can jointly commit to a belief that the collective acted rightly or 
wrongly even if not all members of the collective participated fully or at all in the 
performance of the action in question. In which case, the guilt of a collective is to be 
sharply distinguished from the guilt of any of its individual members. A collective can 
meet Gilbert’s standards for collective guilt in cases where some members did not 
directly participate in the performance of the collective act and where the 
blameworthiness or praiseworthiness of particular group member(s) are clearly absent 
even if there is a clear-cut case of collective guilt. This is because being party to the 
foundational joint commitment means that individual members of the collective have 
attitudes (beliefs and intentions) in an irreducible We-form that cannot be analysed in 
terms of I-attitudes. The individual thereby becomes one of us, with us being the 
collective that intends to ϕ, is jointly committed to ϕ, really does ϕ and post facto jointly 
commits to holding certain beliefs about ϕ. This joint commitment to holding certain 
beliefs about ϕ is important because it is part of the process by which the irreducible 
plural subject is formed.  
 
When it comes to what it is for a collective to feel guilt about what it the collective qua 
collective has done, Gilbert rejects aggregate accounts of feelings of individuals’ 
personal guilt and of feelings of membership guilt. Instead she develops a plural 
subject account of collective guilt feelings. 
 
“For us collectively to feel guilt over our action A is for us to constitute the plural 
subject of a feeling of guilt over our action A.”102 
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This account of collective guilt feelings does not entail that individual guilt feelings are 
prior to those of the collective. For a collective to feel guilt over its action A is for the 
collective to form a plural subject committed to feeling guilt over its action A. The 
notion of commitment is important to Gilbert’s account because it indicates the 
strength of the obligation on the part of the individuals concerned to form a plural 
subject with regard to their intention to ϕ, really does ϕ and post facto holding certain 
beliefs about ϕ. The plural subject account of collective guilt is based on a notion of an 
irreducible collective subject so collective guilt is non-distributive. It is neither 
necessary nor sufficient for members of the collective to feel personal guilt over their 
actions in relation to the collective act or to feel membership guilt over the collective 
act. In the absence of a jointly authorised body each member of the collective jointly 
commits to feel guilt as a collective. This means that the collective guilt results from a 
bottom-up process involving the individual members of the collective. There must also 
be common knowledge of this joint commitment and expressions of collective guilt. In 
making this argument, Gilbert resists any commitment to a necessary 
phenomenological condition of feeling guilt, though she acknowledges that some 
individual members of the collective may experience feeling-sensations and these are 
best thought of as pangs of collective guilt.103 Gilbert’s plural subject account makes 
sense of collective guilt feelings in collectives. 
 
Gilbert presents a number of different examples to illustrate her account of collective 
guilt feelings. One is an atrocity committed by a battalion of soldiers.104 The 
commander of a small battalion orders the battalion to destroy a village along with its 
inhabitants. En route to the village one soldier decides the intended action is wrong 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
103Ibid. 141 
104Ibid. 132 
	   79 
and feigns injury to avoid taking part. Another soldier is genuinely injured as the 
battalion approaches the village and cannot participate. A third soldier has a change 
of heart during the atrocity pretending to take part while really helping some of the 
villagers escape. In the end less than half of the battalion takes part in the attack on 
the village.  
 
In this scenario Gilbert’s plural subject account of collective responsibility runs as 
follows. Collective guilt is appropriate if each member of the collective jointly commits 
to the collective intention and subsequent action and/or jointly commits to the 
commander deciding what the group’s intentions should be. So, if the commander 
decides to destroy the village and enough of the members of the group participate and 
the village really is destroyed we can say that the group fulfilled its intention. In 
Gilbert’s account the battalion is collectively guilty because each member jointly 
committed to the collective intention and subsequent action, they jointly committed to 
the commander deciding what the group’s intentions should be and because some of 
them actually carried out the atrocity. The battalion may coherently accept collective 
guilt for that act. Whether they actually accept that guilt is another thing. This 
requires a joint commitment on the part of the individual members to be collectively 
guilty. The members of the battalion will characterise the action as wrong when 
discussing it among themselves, they will not propose performing another similar 
action and will challenge any other member of the collective who does so. They 
attribute grounds for guilt feelings to the collective (we have done something wrong and we 
should feel guilty) and will remonstrate with members of the group who disagrees that 
the group should feel guilty. On the plural subject account, collective guilt feelings are 
analogous to personal guilt feelings at the collective level. This is because the collective 
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guilt feelings result from the collective’s joint commitment to feel guilt. This means 
that the collective commits to feeling guilt qua collective without individual members 
feeling guilt qua individuals.  
 
Margaret Gilbert is right to try and make sense of commonplace talk of collective 
moral responsibility. Her plural subject account of collective responsibility captures 
the gist of such talk and, therefore, the existence of genuinely collective subjects. For 
Gilbert, the normative status of being guilty does not entail feeling-sensations 
associated with guilt, though it would make sense if individuals and collectives did 
experience such guilty feeling-sensations. Gilbert may or may not be right about the 
phenomenology of feeling-sensations but her account does not hinge on this. Her 
account of joint intentions, joint commitments, joint actions and joint beliefs about 
those actions addresses Wolf’s concern that collectives cannot be held morally 
responsible for their actions because they lack the right kind of inside. Gilbert has 
shown that it does not matter whether the collective experiences certain feeling-
sensations qua collective and/or qua individual members of the collective. The 
individual members can jointly commit to holding certain beliefs about their actions 
and jointly commit to collective moral responsibility as a result of those beliefs. This 
joint commitment is independent of the responsibility of individual members of the 
collective. This is a joint commitment in a strong sense that cannot be rescinded 
unilaterally by any individual member unless there are special side arrangements. 
Collectives characterised by Gilbert as genuinely plural subjects have the kind of 
inside necessary for collective responsibility. The right kind of inside is to do with the 
members of the collective having irreducible We-form attitudes (beliefs and intentions) 
and mutual beliefs rather than emotions. So it does not matter whether the collective 
	   81 
can or does feel guilt. This said Gilbert’s account accepts that it is plausible to argue 
that the collective qua collective may experience the feeling-sensations associated with 
beliefs about the rightness or wrongness of its actions so this is a welcome, but 
additional extra.  
 
There are two main problems with Gilbert’s plural subject account. The first is to do 
with her account of collective responsibility arising from collective action. The second 
is to do with her argument concerning collective guilt and collective guilt feelings. I 
deal with each of these separately below. 
 
 
5.2 Gilbert’s plural subject account  
 
In Gilbert’s plural subject account, collectives qua collectives are dependent on their 
individual members. Gilbert explicitly argues that collectives are irreducible and 
something more than mere aggregates of their individual members. 
 
“I refer to populations as "collectives" when I conceive of them as genuinely 
collective subjects of intention, action, and so on. I take it that a population is a 
genuinely collective subject of intention if and only if, roughly, it can plausibly be 
regarded as having an intention of its own, an intention, if you like, of the 
population as a whole.”105 
 
Yet by Gilbert’s own lights, for a collective to exist in its own right there must be 
individual members that relate to each other in special ways in order to form joint 	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intentions and joint actions and to hold joint beliefs. She is non-committal when it 
comes to the view that collectives are conceptually prior to their individual 
members.106  
 
Gilbert’s account of how plural subjects come to be formed is a ‘bottom-up’ account 
of individuals who come together to agree joint intentions and joint commitments, 
perform joint actions and interact with each other to form joint beliefs about those 
actions. On the basis of those joint beliefs, the members of the collective form further 
joint commitments to being collectively guilty. This may also entail a joint 
commitment to experience the feeling-sensations associated with praise or blame. The 
idea is that for a collective to be guilty is a function of its joint commitment to being 
guilty. So, while the moral responsibility of the collective qua collective may diverge 
from the moral responsibility of some or all of its individual members qua members, 
the attribution of that moral responsibility is reached via the members of the plural 
subject acting qua members.  
 
While Gilbert provides a plural subject account of collective guilt where there may be 
a radical disjunction between the guilt of the collective and the guilt of its members, 
those collectives are not autonomous. They form intentions, act and hold beliefs in 
virtue of the intentions, actions and beliefs of their individual members. Interpreted in 
this way, Gilbert’s account of collective moral responsibility is similar to Seamus 
Miller’s individualistic account of collective responsibility outlined in Chapter 3 
(Miller 2010, Miller 2011). Gilbert’s plural subjects act through their individual 
members as illustrated by her example of the battalion of soldiers.  
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Gilbert’s account cannot deal with those cases where individuals hold incorrect beliefs 
about the actions of the collective, for example by mistakenly believing that the 
collective has (or has not) caused harm. Nor can it deal with those cases where the 
members are of the view that the actions of the collective are nothing to do with them 
and they refuse to jointly commit to attributing collective responsibility, or they are 
unable to agree to do so. In which case, we need an account of collective guilt that 
does not depend so intimately on the intentions, beliefs, actions and commitments of 
the individual members.  
 
The plural subject account of collective guilt yields some other counter-intuitive 
results, which are raised in the following section where I discuss the relationship 
between collective responsibility and collective guilt 
  
 
5.3 The relationship between collective responsibility and collective guilt 
 
In this section I address Gilbert’s arguments to do with collective guilt and collective 
guilty feelings. There are two salient issues here, the first to do the difference between 
collective responsibility and collective guilt. The second is to do with the instrumental 
value of collective guilt. I address these in turn below.  
 
 
5.3.1 Collective responsibility versus collective guilt 
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In his paper about collective responsibility, Joel Feinberg makes a firm distinction 
between the normative status of being guilty and of being responsible (Feinberg 1968). 
According to Feinberg, being guilty is something very specific; it consists in the 
intentional transgression of a prohibition and the guilty parties must pay their debts to 
society.107 Responsibility is different from guilt. It is to do with liability for harm done 
where the responsible person either did the harmful act or made a substantial 
contribution to it. There is a causal connection between the individual’s faulty actions 
and the consequences of those actions (Feinberg 1968). Feinberg thinks it is possible 
for groups to be held collectively responsible for their actions but there is no such 
thing as collective guilt.108 In this section of the chapter I want to show that it is more 
plausible to think in terms of collective responsibility and that like Arendt and 
Feinberg, guilt should be confined to individuals (Arendt 1954/1994, Arendt 1987, 
Feinberg 1968). 
 
Hannah Arendt endorsed Feinberg’s distinction between guilt and being responsible, 
further arguing against the idea of collective guilt (Arendt 1987): 
 
“Where all are guilty nobody is. Guilt, unlike responsibility, always singles out; 
it is strictly personal.”109 
 
Arendt argued that when we declare our guilty feelings for events we did not cause we 
are engaging in “phony sentimentality.”110 Arendt was writing about guilt and 
responsibility mainly with reference to Nazi Germany. Her view was that to hold a 
nation or entire ethnic group guilty is to fail to single out some (the guilty) from others 	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(the innocent), which is the purpose and practical meaning of guilt (Arendt 
1954/1994, Arendt 1987). Guilt is something that is objective and attributable to 
particular individuals. It singles out individual wrongdoers. People cannot be guilty of 
something they did not do (my emphasis). Arendt argues that it is also wrong to feel 
vicarious guilt given her disparaging use of the word sentimentality (my emphasis). 
Arendt’s view is that engaging in this kind of sentimental discourse distracts from the 
more demanding task of taking responsibility for present day structural injustices, for 
example by dismantling them.  
 
Gilbert’s account could be regarded as a response to Arendt’s claim. Gilbert argues 
that her plural subject account of collective guilt can be applied to whole nations. 
Gilbert does not necessarily have in mind what she calls a feature-defined group111 by 
which she means sets of individuals with certain common features like ethnicity, 
gender, social status and economic class, for example.112 Such groups are not 
necessarily collective subjects. Gilbert argues for a plural subject account of collective 
guilt that involves a joint commitment to feel guilt as a collective body. We have seen 
that it is neither necessary nor sufficient for members of the collective to feel 
membership guilt or personal guilt over the actions of the collective. We have also 
seen that it is neither necessary nor sufficient for all members of the collective to have 
participated in the action in question, or even be aware of it or be party to the 
ground-level agreement to authorise an individual or sub-group to act on behalf of the 
collective.  Gilbert applies this argument to large-scale cases involving constitutionally 
elected governments.113 In such cases it may be understood that the government, 
acting through its officials, is entitled to determine the emotional state of its citizens by 	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jointly committing them to feel guilt as a body. The government may try to make 
good the harm done by an act of historic injustice by saying something along the lines 
of, “The whole nation feels guilt over the way it treated you.”114  
 
Applying the plural subject account to large-scale cases involving whole nations is 
problematic. It is not clear in Gilbert’s account how the members of such a large 
collective can agree to a set of joint beliefs about a historic act of injustice and further 
agree to a joint commitment to feel collective guilt as a body. To some extent Gilbert’s 
account can accommodate such concerns. She clearly has in mind the disjunction 
between the moral status of the collective and the moral status of its members that her 
account allows for and the way in which individuals can authorise a body to act on its 
behalf, in this case the constitutionally elected government. Nonetheless there are still 
strongly counter-intuitive aspects to Gilbert’s application of her plural subject account 
to large-scale cases like the collective guilt of whole nations or transnational 
corporations. For example, the authorising body can act on behalf of the collective by 
issuing the apology without all or even most of the members of the collective knowing 
what is happening. It can also commit the collective to a belief about the action 
without most of the members knowing that their collective so believes, or agreeing 
with that belief. Gilbert argues that in large groups where people do not know each 
other personally they must openly express their readiness to be jointly committed with 
other members of the collective. They must do so in such a way that knowledge of 
these expressions filters through to other members so they eventually become 
common knowledge. This process may work for small groups like a battalion of 
soldiers but is unlikely to be satisfactory when it comes to large groups like nations. 
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This is an argument against the scope of Gilbert’s account and its focus on collective 
guilt rather than collective responsibility. 
 
Hannah Arendt well explains why focussing on feelings of guilt as Gilbert does is 
unhelpful: 
 
“Morally speaking, it is as wrong to feel guilty without having done anything 
specific as it is to feel free of all guilt if one actually is guilty of something. I 
have always regarded it as the quintessence of moral confusion that during the 
post-war period in Germany those who personally were completely innocent 
assured each other and the world at large how guilty they felt, while very few 
of the criminals were prepared to admit even the slightest remorse. The result 
of this spontaneous admission of collective guilt was of course a very effective, 
though unintended, white-wash of those who had done something: as we have 
already seen, where all are guilty, no one is.”115  
 
If all are guilty this dilutes the power of identifying the individuals who actually 
committed these wicked acts. This is not to argue that we should only be concerned 
with individual wrongdoers in large-scale cases like Nazi Germany. Where there is 
talk of collective guilt it would be better to speak of vicarious responsibility. Gilbert 
quotes Franklin Roosevelt on the issue of collective responsibility with reference to 
Nazi Germany: 
 
“Too many people here and in England hold to the view that the German 
people as a whole are not responsible for what has taken place – that only a 	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few Nazi leaders are responsible. That unfortunately is not based on fact. The 
German people as a whole must have it driven home to them that the whole 
nation has been engaged in a lawless conspiracy against the decencies of 
modern civilisation.”116 
 
People can be vicariously responsible for things they are not causally connected to, or 
where the causal connection is weak or unclear. This is what Roosevelt means when 
he says that the whole German nation was involved in the lawless conspiracy against 
the decencies of modern civilisation. Vicarious responsibility seems most natural when 
speaking of individuals, for example when they have to stand to account for what their 
siblings or parents may have done.  
 
 
5.3.2 The instrumental value of collective guilt 
 
Iris Marion Young has two conceptual arguments and five pragmatic arguments for 
distinguishing guilt from responsibility and in favour of ascribing responsibility but not 
guilt in a society where there are structural injustices (Young 2013b). The first 
conceptual argument is that guilt requires blameworthiness, but we are often not 
blame for the unjust structures in society. If we fail to monitor those institutions and 
be alert to the structural injustices they perpetuate we are negligent, which itself may 
give rise to guilt. The second conceptual argument is that guilt is backward looking 
while responsibility is forward-looking. Engaging in the type of discourse concerned 
with attributing guilt for historic wrongs means we become mired in the past, 
succumbing to feelings of resentment and revenge. We should not forget historic acts 	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of injustice, but expecting individuals and groups to feel guilt for those wrongs does 
not help the process of reparation. It is also incoherent to blame someone for 
something they have not done. 
 
Now to Young’s five pragmatic arguments (Young 2013b.) First, guilt distracts from 
the work of fixing current structures by focussing on identifying the blameworthy. We 
should be attentive to the historical context of present injustices. This is how learning 
takes place and moral incentives are created. Seeking to ascribe guilt for historic 
wrongs distracts from this process. Young’s second argument is that by focussing on a 
few blameworthy individuals, the rest of us who participate in unjust structures are let 
off the hook. A careful analysis of the ways in which many people benefit from those 
structures, which also oppress and marginalise others, can lead to a greater awareness 
of our shared responsibility to eradicate them. The third argument is that by drawing 
our attention to the actions of individuals a concern with guilt can distract us from the 
background conditions underlying unjust structures. The fourth argument is that 
focussing on blame and guilt leads to people being defensive and uncooperative while 
focussing on responsibility is more likely to lead to co-operation. On the one hand, 
guilt can be a powerful motivator to make good the harm that has been done. On the 
other hand, constantly telling people how bad they are will demotivate them, 
especially if they did not commit the unjust acts. Finally Young argues that guilt leads 
to solipsism where we are more concerned with the state of ourselves than society as a 
whole. Reflection and self-examination is an important part of the process by which 
we come to look outward and focus on others. An excessive preoccupation with guilt 
for things we have not done is a symptom of narcissistic self-obsession.  
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Martha Nussbaum argues that when it comes to how we stand in relation to systemic 
injustice, guilt is “part of the mix.”117 An optimal amount of guilt correctly attributed 
with the right intention can be a powerful and forward-looking incentive to make 
reparations. If guilt is misapplied and people are overburdened with guilt and if the 
wrong people are targeted then it will breed resentment and anger making people 
defensive when they should be open to change. It will also be counter-productive if 
guilt is attributed in a way that hectors people and diminishes their self-respect.  
 
Hannah Arendt was interested in the conditions under which many people are 
responsible without being guilty (and a relatively small number of people are guilty and 
responsible). Young’s view is that our social relationships and our actions as members 
of a contemporary community are what make us more or less responsible for the 
consequences of the community’s background conditions and structural injustices 
(Young 2013b).  Arendt was concerned with a specific historic event and was writing 
relatively soon after that event so her notion of responsibility seems backward looking 
to Young. Arendt’s model of responsibility is concerned with those who were guilty 
and/or responsible for past acts like the Nazi atrocities. Young is concerned to 
develop a notion of responsibility that is forward-looking: 
 
“This responsibility falls on members of a society by virtue of the fact they are 
aware moral agents who ought not be indifferent to the fate of others and the 
danger that states and other organised institutions often pose to some people. 
This responsibility is largely unavoidable in the modern world, because we 
participate in and mainly benefit from the operation of these institutions.”118 
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A person has a responsibility now in relation to current events and their future 
consequences. Another important difference between Young’s notion of responsibility 
and Arendt’s is that while Arendt was concerned with extraordinary and egregious 
acts of injustice such as genocide, Young is more concerned with everyday acts of so-
called ‘ordinary’119 structural injustice such as racism and poverty.  
 
In this chapter I have discussed Margaret Gilbert’s account of collective guilt and 
collective guilt feelings. I have also discussed the instrumental value of guilt. I want to 
develop an account of responsibility that applies both to collectives and individuals 
but, like Arendt, I would like to confine guilt to individuals. In which case the issue of 
distribution does not arise for guilt. We should shy away from burdensome 
misattributions of guilt, collective or otherwise, because doing so leads to defensiveness 
and evasion on the part of those who are being blamed for things they are not 
responsible for. The excessive and repeated use of the language of guilt, liability and 
blame will lead to this sort of response. Gilbert rightly argues that guilt is a powerful 
incentive to make reparations when it is applied in the right way. Guilt can give 
individuals a developmental push towards making good the harm they have done. Yet 
endlessly flagellating ourselves for things we have not done is incoherent and 
counterproductive, leading to outrage, bitterness and denial that prevents us from 
taking responsibility for putting things right. This is why the language of responsibility 
rather than guilt is better suited to how we think about our relation to structural 
injustices. The focus should be on developing a collective recognition of responsibility 
for injustice. In spite of Young’s concerns, Arendt’s account of collective responsibility 
does have contemporary relevance, particularly in relation to her view of collective 	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responsibility being linked to the polis and our shared humanity. Young’s idea of a 
responsibility derived from our membership of a political community is influenced by 
Arendt’s similar views. We should also be attentive to the important difference in their 
accounts between a shared responsibility and a collective responsibility. Young gives 
an account of shared responsibility while Arendt is more concerned with the idea of 
collective responsibility. This has significant implications for my account of 
responsibility that can be assigned to collectives and to individuals, which does not 
entail collective guilt or collective guilt feelings. I develop this further in the following 
chapter. This will be relevant to large-scale cases of structural injustice that cause 
serious, lasting and widespread harm.  
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Chapter 6 
 
Collective Moral Responsibility 
 
 
In this chapter I aim to develop an account of responsibility that applies to individuals 
and to collectives. I will show that Young’s social liability and social connection 
models can be adapted so they each apply to both individuals and to collectives qua 
collectives (Young 2013f). My account is based on the idea of a collective 
responsibility rather than a shared responsibility. In Sections 6.1 and 6.2 I discuss 
Young’s liability and social connection models of responsibility respectively. In Section 
6.3 I discuss the political nature of collective moral responsibility. In spite of its 
political nature, this notion of collective responsibility remains in the moral domain. 
In Section 6.4 I develop an account of collective responsibility based on a combined 
approach to the responsibility as liability and responsibility as social connection 
models. I do this with reference to Young’s arguments concerning responsibility across 
borders (Young 2013d). 
 
Young argues that a sensible understanding of individual responsibility should refer to 
the structural constraints and opportunities she faces and to her choices and actions in 
relation to them (Young 2013e). An account that only focuses on individual 
responsibility fails to notice the structural and socio-economic context that makes 
features of a person and her situation advantageous or disadvantageous. The relevant 
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circumstances that are beyond an individual’s control and are likely to affect how her 
life goes include: 
 
1. Institutional rules. 
2. The power individuals and groups have within institutions 
3. The way that social processes have become materialised in the built environment, 
and,  
4. The cultural habits that people have formed (Young 2013a). 
Institutional decisions make some people vulnerable to domination, exploitation and 
exclusion, e.g. by narrowing the options they have. Institutionalised relations of power 
enable some people to have greater command over resources than others. That there 
is injustice implies there is responsibility of some kind. The guiding question is how 
individuals and collectives should view their responsibility in relation to structural 
injustice? Young’s answer is the social connection model of responsibility, which she 
contrasts with a liability model of responsibility. A key feature of Young’s analysis of 
structural injustice is that it is not possible to identify how the actions of a particular 
individual(s) directly produced harm to others. Her response to this problem is to 
develop an individualistic account of responsibility for justice that omits a role for 
collectives as non-distributive responsibility holders. In Section 6.4 I develop an 
account of collective responsibility that does the institutional work that Young’s 
account denies. 
 
6.1 Responsibility as liability model120 
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The liability model is concerned with blaming a person or group for criminal 
wrongdoing, or finding them at fault in the occurrence of harm. To be liable in this 
sense the individual, either individually or as part of a group, must be shown to have 
caused the harm by their actions, or a criminal failure to act, and to have valid 
justification or excuses that override holding the individual responsible. This model 
can also apply to collectives like corporations where it can be shown that the collective 
qua collective can be treated as a responsibility holder. The liability model is not well 
placed to assign responsibility in relation to on-going contemporary structural 
injustices. It is more concerned with identifying individuals and groups who are liable 
for their actions, which are causally connected to the harm in question. 
 
The main reason Young thinks that the liability model is not applicable to cases of 
structural injustice is that in those cases the structure is produced by many people who 
are acting in accordance with their own best interests and adhering to normally 
accepted rules and practices. A further problem is that the liability model is not well 
suited to assigning individual or collective responsibility in cases of structural injustice 
where we are unable to say that somebody is responsible for the harm that has been 
caused. Also, the language of liability may force people to adopt a defensive attitude, 
which can obstruct the goal of social transformation through policy reform to address 
structural inequalities. Young agrees with Arendt’s distinction between guilt and 
political responsibility. We are responsible for structural injustice to the extent that we 
participate in the on-going operation of a society where such injustice occurs. The 
responsibility is a political responsibility insofar as it derives from our membership of 
the polis (Arendt 1987). This does not make us guilty or blameworthy for structural 
injustice. Responsibility in that sense should be reserved for those individuals and 
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groups who can be specifically identified as intentionally causing the harm, usually 
knowing what they are doing.  
 
This relates to the distinction between Christopher Kutz’s notion of unstructured 
collective harms and Young’s argument about structural injustice discussed in 
Chapter 2 (Kutz 2000, Young 2013e). In Kutz’s account, an unstructured collective 
harm, like the pollution caused by motorists, results from a confluence of individual 
behaviour.121 Young thinks that the pollution caused by motorists is an example of 
structural injustice, but this should not be dealt with under the liability model of 
responsibility because there is an absence of intent to cause the harmful outcomes. 
Therefore, the language of blame, guilt and liability is not relevant in such cases, 
unlike in cases where there is an intention to participate in a collective activity 
designed to cause harm. Young aims to limit the application of the liability model to 
cases where a wrong can be pinned on someone who did something or could have 
prevented it. When it comes to structural injustices Young argues for a different 
conception of responsibility, which she calls the social connection model (Young 
2013f). 
 
 
6.2 Responsibility as social connection model122 
 
This model distinguishes assigning responsibility from finding liability. There are 
several ways of using the term ‘responsible’ in ordinary language. The first is to do 
with being guilty or at fault. This relates to Young’s liability model of responsibility. 
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Another ordinary language use of the term ‘responsible’ is to do with people having 
certain responsibilities in virtue of their social roles or positions. The social connection 
model draws mainly on this notion of responsibility and is to do with how individuals 
fulfil their responsibilities as citizens. It shares with the liability model a concern with 
the causes of wrongs in the form of structural injustice. 
 
Individuals have responsibilities under the social connection model according to 
Young because those who participate in the production and reproduction of structural 
processes with unjust consequences have a shared responsibility to organise collective 
action to transform those structures. Many benefit from and are privileged in the same 
unjust structures that exploit, oppress and marginalise others. It is unlike the liability 
model because no one is specifically liable for the harm done. This is unless a causal 
connection can be traced to an individual or groups of individuals, but this is unlikely 
given the nature of structural injustice. Individual wrongdoers are not isolated under 
the social connection model. Instead, it brings attention to background conditions. Its 
main purpose is forward-looking insofar as it requires individuals to organise to reform 
unjust structures so their outcomes will not be harmful (Young 2013c). Under the 
social connection model the responsibility is general and shared rather than particular 
and individualised as it is in the liability model.  
 
 
6.3 The political nature of the social connection model of moral responsibility 
 
Young’s social connection model is heavily influenced by the work of Hannah Arendt, 
whose formulation of collective responsibility is worth quoting at length: 
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“This vicarious responsibility for things we have not done, this taking upon 
ourselves the consequences for things we are entirely innocent of is the price 
we pay for the fact that we live our lives not by ourselves but by our fellow 
men and that the faculty of action, which, after all, is the political faculty par 
excellence, can be actualised only in one of the many and manifold forms of 
human community.”123 
 
Young also characterises responsibility as a political concept: 
 
“Political responsibility… concerns how things stand in the world. 
Whatever the cause of sufferings, they are our responsibility to notice and 
address.”124 
 
These politicised notions of collective responsibility connect to the arguments about 
circumstantial moral luck and Enoch’s account of duty and penumbral agency in 
Chapter 4 (Enoch 2011). Arendt’s view is that responsibility, unlike guilt, is something 
that can be applied collectively with two conditions. First, people can be held 
responsible for something they have not done. Second, this is because they are 
members of a group and they can take no voluntary action to dissolve that 
membership (Arendt 1987). This indissolubility means that there is a sense in which 
the polis qua polis is responsible. In the first instance the group Arendt has in mind is 
being a member of the German political community. Circumstantial moral luck 
meant that the German people living under the Nazi regime were living in Germany 
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at a time that demanded a response. The following responses were morally 
unacceptable: this has nothing to do with me, I am not a Nazi, I am not Jewish, I am not a leftist 
and so on.   
 
Arendt’s point is that everyone was accountable under the Nazis. This political 
responsibility was real and inescapable. There are two dimensions to the political 
nature of this collective responsibility. First, because the whole community should 
choose to take it upon itself to be responsible as individuals and as a collective for the 
wicked things some of its members have done. In this example, all German citizens 
ought to have taken it upon themselves to be responsible for their fellow Germans’ 
support for the Nazis. This connects to Feinberg’s notion of group liability without 
fault. Second, because the whole community is collectively responsible in a non-
distributive sense for what is done in its name. As far as Arendt s concerned, this is not 
confined to Nazi Germany. It applies to all political communities which ought to 
assume responsibility qua political communities, though not guilt, for the actions of its 
predecessors and for the deeds and misdeeds of its past (Arendt 1987).  
 
This responsibility is both individualistic and non-distributively collective. It is a 
political responsibility because it is part and parcel of living in a polis. Being 
collectively responsible for things we have not done is the price we pay for living in a 
community rather than in solitude. According to Arendt, the only way to avoid this 
collective responsibility is to leave the community one is a member of (Arendt 1987).  
Since it is impossible to live outside of a community what this actually entails is 
swapping one community for another and therefore one set of responsibilities for 
another set of responsibilities. This raises the interesting question of who are the 
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people who can be said to be exempt from collective responsibility. For Arendt it is 
outcasts, refugees and stateless people who are not members of any community and 
therefore cannot be held collectively responsible for anything.125 In which case, 
exemption from collective responsibility comes at a high price. 
 
Arendt’s view of our membership of a community goes beyond national boundaries to 
include shared membership of the human community: 
 
“For many years now we have met Germans who declare that they are 
ashamed of being Germans. I have often been tempted to answer that I am 
ashamed of being human.”126 
 
This is a reference to our responsibility as individuals and collectively across borders. 
The actions of the Nazis were not crimes against the German people or crimes against 
the Jewish people but crimes against humanity. The serious consequence for 
humanity is that we are all responsible as individuals, suitably interpreted, for the 
actions of others, and all political communities are collectively responsible both 
distributively and non-distributively, suitably interpreted, for the actions of other 
political communities. The ‘we’ that is referred to here is the ‘we’ that is a collection of 
individuals and the non-distributive collective ‘we’ of political communities.  
 
Collective responsibility is also a political responsibility because it is other-directed. 
The essential question is not whether the individual is good, but whether she is good 
for the world she lives in. The centre of interest is not the self, which is a moral 
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concern, but the world, which is a political concern.127 What matters about the world 
is who is suffering and what people are doing to end that suffering. Non-participation 
is not an option under these extreme circumstances. People who withdraw from the 
political realm (this is not my business) are not resistors and they are mistaken if they 
believe their attitude does not have any political consequences. Arendt argues that this 
attitude facilitated the Nazi’s rise to power and their wicked crimes thereafter (Arendt 
1987, Arendt 1954/1994).  
 
 
6.4 A combined approach. 
 
In this section of the chapter I discuss concerns with Young’s approach to the liability 
and social connection models of responsibility. In response to those concerns I develop 
an account of responsibility that applies to both collectives and individuals, which like 
Arendt but unlike Gilbert confines guilt to individuals (Arendt 1954/1994, Arendt 
1987, Gilbert 2002). 
 
Young aims to develop a politicised account of moral responsibility that devolves 
responsibility to individuals. Her conception of responsibility is intended to empower 
people to take responsibility for the structural injustices and harms that exist. 
Individual citizens and groups of citizens are accountable by dint of their membership 
of the polis and their shared humanity. Young and Arendt’s accounts of responsibility 
are meant to do the relational work among people, bringing them together to work 
towards the common good by addressing injustices and harms suffered by others.  
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I aim to show that we should take a combined approach to the responsibility as 
liability and responsibility as social connection models. Approaching this an either/or 
choice between the two models fails to address what the polis qua polis owes that its 
members do not. It also has nothing to say about what to do if individuals do not react 
as they are supposed to under the social connection model of responsibility. I also aim 
to find a way of bringing Young’s and Arendt’s approaches together in a coherent way 
that provides a plausible account of individual and collective responsibility. In my 
account the liability and social connection models apply to individuals and to 
collectives. I will do this by arguing that the social connection model applies to 
individuals and to collectives as non-distributive responsibility-holders who have a 
duty to act on their responsibility for structural injustices. If they fail to take up their 
duty the social liability model applies. Even if they do take up their responsibilities the 
social liability model still has a role to play vis-à-vis the role of political communities 
qua communities in redressing injustices. 
 
An important feature of Young’s social connection model is that it is based on a 
shared responsibility. The responsibility is shared because all those who contribute by 
their actions to the structural processes that produce injustice share responsibility for 
those harms. Young explains a shared responsibility as a responsibility that the 
individual personally bears, but does not bear alone.128 The individual bears the 
responsibility aware that others bear it with her. By acknowledging the responsibility 
she acknowledges that she is part of an inchoate collective that produces injustice. The 
individual shares with other individuals a responsibility to dismantle unjust and 
oppressive structures. The responsibility is shared because many individuals acting 
together within accepted institutions according to prevailing norms and values 	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produce the harms. Young explicitly contrasts the idea of a shared responsibility with 
a collective responsibility. The former is a distributed while the latter is not.129 A 
collective responsibility is one where the collective is the responsibility holder without 
that responsibility distributing to any of its members. This relates to Joel Feinberg’s 
notion of non-distributive collective responsibility discussed in Chapter 4 (Feinberg 
1968). The social connection model is based on a shared responsibility where the 
responsibility is divided up among individuals who each contribute in some 
indeterminate way to producing unjust outcomes as a result of their actions. 
 
As Young acknowledges, one reason individuals may not take up their responsibility 
under the social connection model is because they are overwhelmed by the demands it 
places on them.130 The demandingness of Young’s social connection model is further 
increased by her account of structural global injustice, which Young presents as an 
example of its application (Young 2013d). I shall use the same example to illustrate 
some problems with Young’s account of responsibility, particularly with regard to her 
distinction between a shared responsibility and a collective responsibility. I will 
develop an account that is based on a responsibility for justice that applies to 
individuals and to collectives non-distributively. It will be an account of collective 
responsibility rather than a shared responsibility. 
 
Young argues that there is much injustice in the world and those of us in economically 
more developed parts of the world particularly contribute to the production of this 
injustice. The implication of this for the social connection model of responsibility is 
that such responsibility is sometimes global. Young thinks we should not seek to divide 
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and measure this responsibility since it is a genuinely shared endeavour to address 
these global injustices. In Young’s account the attribution of responsibility does not 
track the distribution of power. The example of global injustice Young has in mind is 
sweatshops.131 Sweatshops are an example of structural global injustice that benefits 
some, like consumers by providing them with cheap clothing and transnational 
corporations by providing them with a source of cheap labour, while seriously 
harming those who endure sweatshops. Young refers to the anti-sweatshop movement 
as an illustration of the social connection model. She characterises it as an 
international grassroots movement of people coming together to create a public 
discussion of the injustice of working conditions, leading to action that has had some 
success in changing global institutions and practices. Young acknowledges that her 
approach to global injustice and the social connection model of responsibility may 
lead to “the vertigo of political responsibility.”132 Our responsibilities as citizens of the 
polis are truly international in character. They are not confined by national 
boundaries. This chimes with Arendt’s account of our responsibilities as being derived 
from our shared humanity. In this example, individual citizens of the United 
Kingdom cannot avoid responsibility by claiming that the working conditions of the 
citizens of Bangladesh or the citizens of China are nothing to do with them. Our 
common humanity means that it is our business. The vertigo of political responsibility 
is caused by the demands Young’s account places on individuals and groups of 
individuals distributively when it comes to addressing global injustice. This is not 
confined to those who benefit from cheap manufactured goods. For example, Young 
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argues that those who work in sweatshops have a key role to play in organising and 
mobilising themselves and others to end their oppression and exploitation.133  
 
An important problem with Young’s argument is that she has little to say about the 
role of collectives qua collectives like states, international institutions and transnational 
corporations, except when she explains why they should not play a major role in 
dealing with responsibility across borders.134 Young’s key reason for downplaying the 
role of states and global and national institutions in this process is that their rules and 
practices are more aligned with the powers and processes that produce and perpetuate 
injustice than with those who seek to undermine it. She is of the view that we cannot 
turn to states and institutions as a means to deliver global justice since they have a 
vested interest in maintaining the status quo.135 This part of her argument ignores the 
fact that individuals, including Young, also have vested interests of their own. 
 
It is mistaken for Young’s individualistic social connection model of responsibility to 
deny the role played by collectives. In the context of Young’s account of structural 
injustice, it is hard to conceive of any individual or groups of individuals causing as 
much harm as collectives like transnational corporations. The really large ones have 
assets and turnovers that far exceed the GDP (gross domestic product) of many nation 
states in the world today. In terms of power and influence, such transnational 
corporations are among the most powerful institutions in societies if not the most 
powerful. This is why an analysis of the injustice of responsibility for global structural 
injustice should include an analysis of the role of collectives qua collectives like 
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transnational corporations. Opponents of collective responsibility have failed to 
appreciate two things in adhering to their individualism.  
 
First, that the notion of a corporation cannot merely be reduced to the behaviour of 
its individual members. According to individualists, the corporation is simply an 
aggregate of individuals. Under the alternative analysis proposed by my account, 
collectives like transnational corporations are over and above a mere aggregation of 
individuals and, unlike in Margaret Gilbert’s account, they are conceptually prior to 
their individual members (Gilbert 2002). As discussed in Chapter 4, collectives like 
transnational corporations have a tightly focused structure and organisation. Within 
this structure and organisation policies and strategies are articulated, formulated, 
discussed, rejected or approved and then implemented. Only the individual members 
can articulate, formulate, debate and discuss, reject/approve the collective’s goals and 
the means for carrying them out. These individuals are not fictive or abstract; they are 
people acting within a certain social context, fulfilling certain functions and carrying 
out certain roles. It is too simplistic to view these people as purely autonomous within 
the transnational corporation given how its structure and organisation supervenes on 
them. 
 
Second, Young’s account characterises structural injustice as the accumulation of the 
unintended consequences of individual actions and, therefore, no one single individual 
agent could be blamed for the collective wrong that might ensue. Theories of 
individual responsibility imply a basic view of causation in which the only important 
type of action is one where a single individual can single-handedly bring about 
harmful consequences either intentionally and/or negligently. Not all actions fall 
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under this paradigm so, ex hypothesi, collective wrongs do not fall under it. For 
example, three corporations produce carbon emissions by burning fossil fuels (which is 
a case of global structural injustice in addition to sweatshop labour.) If one were to 
pose the question regarding each corporation: does it’s burning of fossil fuels cause the 
serious health complications like low lung functioning that are caused by carbon 
emissions, the answer would be no. It is the accumulation of the unintended 
consequences of their and many other corporations’ individual actions that cause 
harm. Individualistic theories of responsibility would let all the corporations off the 
hook. Collectives like corporations have access to very large resources and each of 
them ought to have foreseen that their burning of fossil fuels could cumulatively cause 
serious, widespread and lasting harm. The corporation qua corporation can, 
therefore, be reasonably held culpable if people experienced health problems as a 
result of their actions. 
 
Young acknowledges that a key problem with the social connection model of 
responsibility is that it is highly demanding not least when it is applied globally. It is 
therefore counter-intuitive that she sidelines states and global institutions as part of the 
campaign against global injustice since this would be a way of reducing the demands 
placed on individuals by the social connection model. The actions of states and 
international institutions should not replace the activism of the citizens but in some 
cases they could be deployed to do the ‘heavy lifting’ required to pressurise other 
states and transnational corporations to end their reliance on sweatshop labour. 
 
This illustrates a significant limitation in her preference for a notion of a shared 
responsibility rather than a collective responsibility. As Young explains it, a shared 
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responsibility to end structural injustice means that individuals become active citizens 
who organise themselves to campaign against sweatshop conditions. Individuals 
acquire that responsibility in virtue of the role they play in perpetuating structural 
injustice. This argument can also apply non-distributively to collectives like states and 
international institutions because they not only perpetuate the structural injustice they 
set the rules of the game whereby the structural injustice comes into existence in the 
first place. The collective responsibility is non-distributive because it may be the case 
that no individual member of the collective is personally responsible for the actions of 
the collective. This is a reason for the collective to be a non-distributive responsibility 
holder rather than shift the responsibility away from the collective and onto individual 
citizens. 
 
Young is too quick to dismiss the role of states and international institutions in 
bringing about global justice. It is states and international organisations like the IMF 
and the WTO whose rules and practices favour the interests of the more affluent 
nations of the world and the multinationals associated with those states. These 
constitute a powerful set of international institutions whose current practices serve the 
interests of transnational corporations, large national corporations and affluent states. 
Grassroots action operating through the social connection model against these 
institutions is an important solution to these problems. It would make sense to direct 
this activism towards the reform of those states and institutions to promote global 
justice by deploying reformed international law, states and institutions to change and 
expand the rules so they better meet the needs of the poorest and most vulnerable 
people and nations. It is also the case that states have the power to interact with other 
states to reform and improve the rules and practices of international trade. It is 
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mistaken to argue that states cannot be expected to change the exploitative systems 
they benefit from. Activism directed towards collectives like the state can make a 
difference here and one example of this is the British government being committed to 
spending 0.7% of its GDP annually on international aid. Collectives qua collectives 
also mediate between the activist and those who benefit from her activism. They are a 
necessary means for promoting justice given that social justice concerns the broad 
patterns of social positions and relationships in society, which requires collective 
action and that requires organisation. This is why it is mistaken to emphasise the 
notion of a shared responsibility at the expense of a non-distributive collective 
responsibility as Young does.  
 
For the reasons I have outlined above we should favour an approach that equally 
value individualistic and collectivist perspectives. Young rightly develops a theory of 
responsibility for justice that requires individuals to act in relation to individual 
wrongdoing and structural injustice. It is mistaken, however, to do this at the expense 
of a non-distributive notion of collective responsibility that calls on collectives to act as 
well as individuals. 
 
Young’s liability model works in some scenarios but not others. It is appropriate when 
dealing with cases that are to do with transient individuals relating to each other 
rather than those cases that are to do with collectives that persist through time as in 
the case of nations trading with each other on unequal and exploitative terms. It is not 
clear that the social connection model as Young conceives it can explain or address 
those cases. The social connection model fails to make clear what the polis owes that 
individuals do not. Bypassing the institutions of the polis and overloading individuals 
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with excessive responsibility creates the problem of the vertigo of political 
responsibility that Young identifies. 
 
We can solve this problem by returning to David Enoch’s conception of penumbral 
agency discussed in Chapter 4 (Enoch 2011). Enoch’s argument that there is an 
important difference between being responsible and taking responsibility is 
particularly relevant. According to Enoch, we have a duty to take responsibility for 
that which falls within our penumbral agency. We can use Young’s and Arendt’s 
accounts of responsibility to give us reasons why it is our duty to take responsibility in 
the way described by Enoch. Under the social connection model individuals and 
collectives have a duty to take responsibility because they are members of the human 
community and members of the polis, not because these cases fall within the scope of 
Enoch’s concept of “penumbral agency.”136 If individuals and collectives fail to act 
under the social connection model then moral liability applies in the form of the 
liability model. This argument about the social connection and social liability models 
applies to both individuals and to collectives non-distributively. 
 
Including collectives like states and institutions in our discussions about responsibility 
as well as individuals gives us another reason to reconstitute the liability model 
rejected by Young. She thinks that the liability model cannot help us address 
contemporary structural injustices that have their roots in past acts of injustice. There 
are non-distributive collective solutions to this problem in the form of states and 
corporations. The German state’s annual payment of reparations to Israel can be used 
here to illustrate how states can address past acts on injustice under the liability 
model. Similarly, German companies have paid reparations to Holocaust survivors as 	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financial compensation for the part they played in assisting the Nazi state. This also 
solves the further problem Young identified with the liability model, namely the 
language of liability obstructing the goal of social transformation through policy 
reform to address structural inequalities. If such language is applied in a non-
distributive fashion so the liability is attributed to the state or corporation rather than 
its members, then this leaves individuals to act in the ways prescribed by Young’s 
social connection model, free of the burden of liability.  
 
In this chapter I have developed an account of non-distributive collective 
responsibility that can be used alongside the Young’s notion of shared responsibility. 
Whereas Young’s approach is individualistic, my account applies to individuals and to 
collectives as non-distributive responsibility holders in both the liability model and the 
social connection model.  The political faculty “par excellence”137 for Arendt is action 
and this means that collective or political responsibility entails political activism or 
non-passivity at the minimum. Rather than choose between the social connection and 
liability models we should combine them to provide an account of how individuals 
and collectives qua collectives take up their responsibilities and fulfil their duties to 
each other.  
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Chapter 7 
 
Conclusion 
 
I. M. Young’s central project is to conceptualise our shared individual responsibilities 
when faced with global structural injustice given that our individual actions enact 
contribute to producing and reproducing those injustices (Young 2013f). Young’s 
individualistic account misses something important about collective moral 
responsibility. Problems of global injustice are often caused by structural injustices. In 
the absence of clear individual causal or moral responsibility, the production of 
structural injustices suggests a role for a collectivist conception of moral responsibility. 
In response to Young’s analysis I have developed an account of moral responsibility 
that applies to individuals and to collectives non-distributively. I have been 
particularly concerned with structural injustice because this is a form of injustice 
where the harms are serious but are not traceable to individual wrongdoers. In 
Chapter 2 I clarified the meaning of the concept of structural injustice and explicated 
other concepts that are important to this thesis. I also discussed Young’s liability and 
social models of responsibility for justice. In Chapter 3 I explained what is meant by 
moral responsibility, analysed individualistic accounts and then applied those accounts 
to complex cases of co-ordinated action. I explained the relationship between these 
accounts and Young’s own individualistic account of responsibility. In Chapter 4 I 
presented Joel Feinberg’s taxonomy of attributions of collective responsibility 
(Feinberg 1968). I also demonstrated how his notion of non-distributive collective 
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responsibility could be used to reply to individualistic views of complex cases of co-
ordinated action. In Chapter 5 I evaluated Margaret Gilbert’s account of collective 
guilt and collective guilt feelings. I also explicated the distinction between guilt and 
responsibility. I developed the view that there is an instrumental value to guilt since 
responses like shame, guilt and regret help to register the significance of the harm that 
has been done. Correctly applied, guilt can have a curative and motivating effect 
when it comes to motivating people to act. Guilt can be counter-productive, however, 
forcing people into a defensive posture resistant to the idea that they must take 
responsibility for some wrong and make good the harm that has been done. My 
account confines guilt to individuals rather than collectives. In which case, the issue of 
distribution does not apply. In Chapter 6 I analysed Hannah Arendt, David Enoch 
and Iris Marion Young’s arguments about the political nature of moral responsibility 
(Arendt 1987, Enoch 2011, Young 2013e). I also developed an account of collective, 
non-distributive moral responsibility that can run alongside Young’s individualistic 
account of responsibility across borders (Young 2013f). I demonstrated how this 
approach applies to both her liability model and her social connection model. I 
develop an account of how we can describe institutions in moral terms and that a 
particular notion of non-distributive collective moral responsibility does the 
institutional work that Young’s account denies when it comes to responsibility for 
justice. 
 
My account is not intended to replace individualistic conceptions of moral 
responsibility. Given the task of mapping the contours of moral responsibility we 
should be attentive to collectivist accounts as well as those accounts that aim to 
delineate the nature of individual responsibility. The literature invariably presents the 
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relationship between individualistic and collectivist accounts as a binary choice. This 
is mistaken. I have shown that it is feasible to approach this subject in such a way that 
we can deploy models of responsibility that apply to individuals and to collectives. 
Collectivist accounts should be used to provide an additional layer or moral 
responsibility, particularly in cases on structural injustice that lead to some of the most 
serious, widespread and lasting harms. Given the seriousness of the harms that 
collectives do and cause it is erroneous to think individual can rectify these wrongs 
solely as a result of a shared responsibility. There is a place in this schema for a 
stronger notion of non-distributive collective responsibility that addresses what the 
polis qua polis and other collectives qua collectives must do to rectify the serious harm 
they cause.  
 
There are at least two areas that can be explored further. The first is to do with 
responsibility for acts of historic injustice. Many of the structural injustices in 
contemporary society are caused by past acts of injustice. It would be interesting to 
research how we allocate responsibility for historic acts of injustice to individuals and 
to collectives. The process of allocating responsibility in such cases is complicated by 
the fact that the original perpetrators and victims of these serious wrongs are no 
longer alive. It does not go unnoticed that in cases like these across many generations 
the same groups repeatedly benefit from structural injustice while the same groups are 
repeatedly harmed by the same structures.  
 
The second and related suggestion for further research is to do with acts of 
commemoration and acts of remembrance. The role of historical memory is crucial 
here because the collective discussion and retelling of historic injustice is an important 
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way for differently positioned members of contemporary society to nurture respectful 
relations with one another. Historical analysis helps us understand how present 
conditions are structural, why they have arisen and where intervention to change 
them might be most effective. It would be interesting to research the collective 
responsibility to deal with the past as memory. One of the ways in which we can bear 
witness is through our acts of remembrance and acts of commemoration of the past. 
This should not be taken to imply that our relations to history are primarily a question 
about justice, i.e. something we owe. It is something that is of value in and of itself. 
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